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Abstract 
We study the impact of stronger shareholder control on bondholders. We find that the passage 
of shareholder-sponsored governance proposals causes a decline in CDS spreads, indicating a 
net positive effect on bondholders. Evidence suggests that the direct benefit of stronger 
shareholder control, through “management disciplining” channel, is larger than the combined 
adverse effects of directly escalating shareholder-bondholder conflict and indirectly 
exacerbating exposure to shareholder opportunism. Results are stronger for firms with existing 
high levels of shareholder-bondholder conflict and for proposals that mitigate managerial 
entrenchment without exacerbating risk-shifting. Finally, stronger shareholder control improves 
credit ratings and operating performance in the long-term. 
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What is the impact of stronger shareholder control on bondholders? Do bondholders benefit 
because stronger shareholders discipline management, or are they worse off because stronger 
shareholders pursue their own interests at the expense of bondholders? In this paper, we address 
these questions by studying the impact on the riskiness of debt of corporate governance changes 
that lead to stronger shareholder rights. Employing a regression discontinuity design, we find 
that increasing shareholder rights causes a decline in the riskiness of debt. 
The Anglo-Saxon view of corporate governance is mainly defined in terms of improving and 
protecting shareholder control (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). Thus, corporate governance policies 
are predominantly designed to advance and protect shareholders’ interests; therefore, their 
impact on shareholders is expected to be positive. Evidence in the literature largely supports this 
prediction (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe (2012)). However, 
the net impact of these policies on bondholders is the outcome of three opposing forces and is 
therefore complicated and unclear. In the Jensen and Meckling (1976) framework, bondholders 
face two conflicts: managerial entrenchment, defined as the conflict between management and 
both bondholders and shareholders, and the conflict between shareholders and bondholders. The 
first channel, “management disciplining,” relates to the fact that if more shareholder control 
translates into more effective monitoring and disciplining of entrenched management, 
bondholders benefit. In contrast, the second channel, “wealth redistribution,” captures the idea 
that shareholders’ misuse of their control by undertaking riskier projects (risk shifting) would be 
detrimental to bondholders.   
Moreover, the impact of managerial entrenchment on bondholders can in fact be even more 
complicated than described above. Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2010) argue that managerial 




entrenchment itself has both a direct and an indirect effect on bondholders’ risk. As discussed 
above, on the one hand, entrenched managers can enrich themselves to the detriment of 
shareholders and bondholders, for example by “empire building” (Jensen and Meckling (1976); 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989)). On the other hand, due to shareholder-management conflict, an 
entrenched manager can sometimes act as a deterrent to shareholder opportunism (examples 
include large payouts and leverage-increasing takeovers), thereby benefitting bondholders. We 
call this third channel “opportunism resistance.” It is well established in the literature that 
opportunistic behavior by shareholders adversely affects bondholders (Jensen and Meckling 
(1976); Myers (1977); Kim and McConnell (1977); Cook and Martin (1991); Warga and Welch 
(1993)). In other words, given the shareholder-management conflict on the one hand and the 
shareholder-bondholder conflict on the other, an intricate interplay arises between management, 
shareholders, and bondholders, which indicates that depending on the intensity of the existing 
shareholder-bondholder conflict, alleviating managerial entrenchment can both exacerbate and 
mitigate the risk to bondholders. Therefore, the impact on bondholders of stronger shareholder 
control depends on the relative strength of management disciplining, wealth redistribution, and 
opportunism resistance channels, and thus is much more complex and nuanced compared to its 
effect on shareholders. It follows that the net effect of these opposing forces on bondholders, and 
therefore on riskiness of debt, is a priori ambiguous and is ultimately an empirical question.  
It is challenging to address this empirical question because a change in governance structure 
itself is usually endogenous. As pointed out by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), it is very 
difficult to make a causal statement about the effect of corporate governance on any outcome in a 
firm unless one can identify an exogenous shift in corporate governance structure. Following 
Cuñat et al. (2012, hereafter CGG), we use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits 




the discontinuity in the probability of implementing shareholder-sponsored proposals. More 
specifically, we compare the effect of “close-call” proposals, shareholder-sponsored proposals 
that pass or fail by a small margin, on credit default swap (CDS) spreads. This method helps 
address endogeneity, facilitates identification, and establishes more confidence in a causal 
interpretation of our findings. We show that it is exactly these close-call proposals that have 
meaningful and relevant information content. In contrast, those proposals that fail or pass 
decisively elicit no market reaction since their outcomes are already predicted and reflected in 
the prices.  
Using rating-adjusted CDS spread changes surrounding the voting date (following the 
methodology in Jorion and Zhang (2007); Finnerty, Miller, and Chen (2013); Andres, Betzer, 
and Doumet (2017)), we find that CDS spreads drop by up to 25 basis points (bps) on average 
after the passage of a corporate governance proposal. This is equivalent to an 18% drop in CDS 
spreads for an average firm in our sample. These findings indicate that stronger shareholder 
rights have a net positive impact on bondholders. Using the theoretical comparability between 
CDS spreads and bond-yield spreads (Duffie (1999)), we can think of a five-year CDS as a bond 
with a modified duration of approximately five years. It then follows that a 25 bps drop in the 
spreads indicates a 1.25% increase in bond value. This is equivalent to $129 million for an 
average firm in our sample. Further, we show that the reported net positive effect on bondholders 
is mainly driven by nontakover-related (non-G-Index-related)1 proposals and those that dilute 
entrenchment without offsetting amplification of shareholder-bondholder conflicts.  
Moreover, opportunism resistance channel implies that there is not a generic managerial 
entrenchment effect that always goes against bondholders’ interest. Entrenchment leading to 
 
1 A takeover vulnerability index developed by Gompers et al. (2003) is widely used in corporate governance literature. 




investment policies that raise default risk hurts bondholders, but entrenchment that dilutes 
shareholder opportunism against bondholder expropriation helps bondholders. Therefore, 
alleviating entrenchment may indirectly increase the riskiness of debt. Consistent with the 
prediction of this channel, we find that ameliorating managerial entrenchment increases the 
riskiness of debt for firms where entrenchment dilutes shareholder opportunism. Specifically, we 
find an offsetting effect for the drop in the CDS spreads of these firms that is consistent with 
Chava et al. (2010) and highlights the novel implication of the three-way interaction between 
shareholders, bondholders, and management.  
While our baseline results indicate that the outcome of this interaction is on average a net 
benefit to bondholders, it would be insightful to compare the relative strength of the three 
channels. We do so by exploiting our sample’s cross-sectional variation in degrees of managerial 
entrenchment and shareholder-bondholder conflict. First, we hypothesize a larger drop in the 
CDS spreads for the cross-section of firms with existing high levels of shareholder-bondholder 
conflict. For these firms, the marginal cost of stronger shareholder control is smaller than its 
marginal benefit. Since shareholder-bondholder conflict is already high for these firms, by 
further exacerbating this conflict, stronger shareholder control would have a smaller marginal 
negative impact on bondholders relative to its marginal positive effect. We find empirical 
support for this hypothesis. The drop in CDS spreads is larger for firms with speculative credit 




ratings, high CEO ownership, high leverage, and those that pay large dividends and have 
shrinking cash flow. 2  
Second, opportunism resistance hypothesis suggests that there are occasions where 
ameliorating entrenchment could have an indirect adverse impact on bondholders, offsetting its 
benefits. Consistent with this prediction, we find that the reported larger drop in CDS spreads of 
firms with high existing levels of shareholder-bondholder conflict is offset among a subset of this 
group of firms where entrenchment dilutes shareholder opportunism. For instance, we find that 
for high leverage firms, the 17 basis-point drop in CDS spread is cut by almost 8 basis points.  
Third, we hypothesize that CDS spreads rise for firms with existing low levels of managerial 
entrenchment. For these firms, the marginal cost of increased shareholder control must be larger 
than its marginal benefit. Since for these firms managerial entrenchment is already low, its 
mitigation would have a small marginal positive impact on bondholders relative to the marginal 
negative impact that is caused by the increase in shareholder-bondholder conflict. Our empirical 
results do not support this hypothesis. We find no increase in CDS spreads for firms with low E-
Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)), without CEO duality, with (relatively) shorter CEO 
tenure, nor for firms with low acquisition activities. In fact, although insignificant, almost all the 
coefficients have a negative sign, indicating a reduction in the spreads. This result indicates that 
the increase in the cost of stronger shareholder control to bondholders is not large enough to 
overshadow the benefits of lowering managerial entrenchment, even where those benefits are 
 
2 Some studies that use these variables to control for shareholder-bondholder conflict include Bhojraj and Sengupta 
(2003); Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006); Chava et al. (2010); Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007). Chava, 
Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009) point out that “shareholder-friendly” managers can exacerbate shareholder-
bondholder conflict.  




expected to be minimal. Overall, this set of results seems to suggest that from the bondholders’ 
perspective, the marginal negative direct effect of exacerbating the shareholder-bondholder 
conflict and the indirect adverse effect of ameliorating entrenchment that result from increased 
shareholder control are secondary to the gains from mitigating managerial entrenchment.  
We also provide long-term evidence that supports our findings. We document a significant 
improvement in z-score and a decline in leverage ratio and cost of debt within one year of the 
election date. We also find upgrades in credit rating starting in two years. Examining how 
changes in governance structure affect risk shifting and asset substitution concerns, we show that 
over one to three years after the vote, cash flow growth volatility and stock price volatility 
decrease.  
While much of the literature is focused on the impact of corporate governance on 
shareholders (McConnell and Servaes (1990); Yermack (1996); Karpoff, Malatesta, and 
Walkling (1996); Gompers et al. (2003)), our paper belongs to the more recent literature that 
evaluates corporate governance from the perspective of bondholders (e.g., Chava et al. (2009); 
Cremers et al. (2007); Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006); Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005); 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003)). Our paper contributes to the literature on several fronts. Our 
findings complement the CGG results, and together they provide a comprehensive picture of the 
causal effect of stronger shareholder control on the firm’s external stakeholders. Results suggest 
that by mitigating managerial entrenchment, stronger shareholder control aligns the interests of 
shareholders and bondholders and therefore both parties benefit. These findings are also 
consistent with prior research on shareholder-bondholder conflict in other corporate events. 
Focusing on leveraged buyouts, Marais, Schipper, and Smith (1989) find no evidence of loss to 
bondholders. While this finding is contested by later studies (Asquith and Wizman (1990); 




Warga and Welch (1993)), those studies find that losses to bondholders are relatively small. The 
evidence in Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) is also consistent with the notion that the gains (lower 
bond yield and higher credit ratings) from mitigating managerial entrenchment are greater than 
the negative impact of wealth transfer. Furthermore, our paper provides a favorable view for the 
effect of shareholder activism on bondholders that is consistent with results in Sunder, Sunder, 
and Wongsunwai (2014) and adds to the evidence in Jiang, Li, and Shao (2010). 
We differ from the existing literature in multiple dimensions. First, our main finding 
contrasts with previous studies. Whereas we find that stronger shareholder control has a net 
positive effect on bondholders, studies by Klock et al. (2005) and Chava et al. (2009) find the 
opposite. However, we provide evidence that the inconsistency of our results with those of prior 
studies is attributable to our identification strategy and not to the difference in our samples. We 
show that using our sample but following the methodology applied in those studies, one can 
obtain results that are similar to those in prior research. Second, using regression discontinuity 
design establishes more confidence in making a causal statement about the impact of governance 
on bondholders. Given the significance of this issue to academics, practitioners, and policy 
makers, finding and exploiting an exogenous change in governance structure to provide a causal 
estimate substantially improves our understanding of this relationship. Third, prior studies 
(Klock et al.( 2005); Chava et al. (2009)) examine the governance impact predominantly through 
the prism of takeover vulnerability (G-Index). We, however, take a more comprehensive 
approach by looking at the effect of shareholder proposals that cover different dimensions of 
corporate governance. Thus, the scope of our approach provides a more complete picture of the 
effect of stronger shareholder control on bondholders and allows us to identify the link between 
bondholders’ interest and governance structure. Fourth, prior studies use bond yield spreads or 




loan spreads to evaluate the impact on bondholders. Instead, we use CDS spreads. The 
superiority of CDS relative to bond spreads in reflecting the credit risk of a firm is well 
documented in the literature (Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005); Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh 
(2005); Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009); Friewald, Wagner, and Zechner (2014)). Finally, 
we confirm the veracity of our results by conducting a series of robustness checks. We test the 
random assignment assumption of RDD and further confirm that our results are not driven by 
vote manipulation by the management. To address the concern for sample selection bias arising 
from using CDS firms, we compare our sample characteristics to those of the COMPUSTAT 
universe during the sample period. Similar to Subramanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014a), we also 
find that the firms with traded CDS contracts are larger, have stronger balance sheet and 
relatively high credit quality, indicating that it is unlikely that the benefit of stronger shareholder 
control on bondholders are overstated in our results. We further address this concern formally 
and confirm our earlier findings by estimating a Heckman’s selection model in conjunction with 
RDD.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section II we discuss the background 
and conceptual framework and develop hypotheses. Section III presents the empirical design, our 
identification strategy, and the data. Section IV presents our main results and analyzes the effect 
of different proposal types. In Section V, we provide more evidence from the cross-section, by 
dissecting the channels. In Section VI, we conduct a series of robustness checks. We discuss our 
long-term findings and contrast our results with previous findings in the literature in Section VII. 
Section VIII concludes. 




II.  Background and Conceptual Framework 
A.  The Three-Way Interaction  
Corporations can be characterized by a three-way interaction among self-interested 
shareholders, managers, and bondholders. While the literature has largely focused on the 
bilateral shareholder-bondholder and shareholder-manager conflicts, analyzing the effect of 
stronger shareholder control on bondholders requires a close examination of this three-way 
interaction. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of this three-way interaction framework. This 
framework includes two direct channels with opposite effects of stronger shareholder control on 
bondholders, namely, wealth redistribution and management disciplining, and an indirect 
channel with a negative effect caused by ameliorating entrenchment.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Wealth redistribution channel (capturing the conflict between shareholders and bondholder) 
is based on the fact that shareholders of levered companies have incentives for risk shifting 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976). In levered companies, equity is a call option on the corporate 
assets and its value increases in risk. The value of a risky bond is equal to the value of a portfolio 
of a risk-free but otherwise identical bond plus a short position in a put option written on firms’ 
assets (Merton (1974)). By increasing asset volatility, risk shifting increases the value to 
shareholders (i.e., the value of the call option increases) but reduces the value to bondholders 
(i.e., the value of the shorted put option increases). Moreover, corporate law in the U.S. imposes 
no fiduciary duty on the directors and officers toward bondholders. This provides a legal 
motivation for expropriation of the bondholders to increase shareholder value. Similarly, 
Cremers et al. (2007) and Chava et al. (2009) argue that strong shareholder control implies better 
alignment of management with shareholders. These “shareholder-friendly” managers may raise 
asset substitution concerns for bondholders and intensify shareholder-bondholder conflict. 




Therefore, this channel suggests that more shareholder rights are detrimental to bondholders and 
increase the riskiness of debt (Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003); Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006); 
Warga and Welch (1993); Shleifer and Summers (1988); Klock et al. (2005); Parrino (1997); 
Maxwell and Rao (2003); Parrino and Weisbach (1999); Maxwell and Stephens (2003)). This 
discussion leads to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Wealth Redistribution Effect: By escalating shareholder-bondholder conflict, 
stronger shareholder control increases the riskiness of debt.   
Management disciplining channel (capturing the conflict between management and both 
shareholders and bondholders) is rooted in the separation between ownership and management 
that creates an incentive for management to act in its own self-interest and to deviate from 
shareholder value maximization (e.g., shirking, focusing on short-term returns, 
overcompensation, and empire building. See Jensen and Meckling (1976); DeAngelo and Rice 
(1983); Dechow and Sloan (1991); Murphy and Zimmerman (1993); Murphy (1985); Jensen 
(1986)). Thus, to the extent that increasing shareholder rights translates into a more effective 
disciplining of management (e.g., better monitoring), it prevents value destruction, reduces 
default risk, and is therefore beneficial to all stakeholders, including bondholders. This channel 
suggests that increasing shareholder rights is beneficial to bondholders and reduces the riskiness 
of debt (Sengupta (1998); Bhojraj and Sengupta( 2003); Fields, Fraser, and Subrahmanyam 
(2012); Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006); Carcello and Neal (2000); Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb 
(2004)).  
Hypothesis 2. Management Disciplining Effect: By ameliorating managerial entrenchment, when 
entrenchment raises default risk, stronger shareholder control reduces the riskiness of debt.  




It is imperative to include in the above discussion the indirect effect of shareholder-
management conflict when examining the effect of management disciplining on bondholders. As 
argued by Chava et al. (2010), there is no generic managerial entrenchment effect that always 
goes against bondholders’ interest. Entrenchment leading to investment policies that raise default 
risk hurts bondholders, but entrenchment that dilutes shareholder opportunism against 
bondholder expropriation helps bondholders. Entrenched managers are unlikely to pay out 
extraordinarily large dividends. To avoid market scrutiny, they rely on internal cash and other 
liquid assets to finance “empire building.” Entrenched managers also generally resist leverage-
increasing takeovers. While these takeovers are beneficial to shareholders, they are considered a 
risk factor to bondholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Myers (1977); Kim and McConnell 
(1977); Cook and Martin (1991); Warga and Welch (1993)). In these occasions, entrenched 
managers and bondholders are allies against opportunist shareholders. Therefore, contrary to 
shareholders who unambiguously benefit from mitigating managerial entrenchment, disciplining 
management has an indirect adverse impact on bondholders in addition to its direct positive 
effect. Therefore, as Figure1 illustrates, due to the three-way interaction, the impact on 
bondholders of ameliorating managerial entrenchment is much more complex and nuanced 
compared to its effect on shareholders. 
As highlighted by Chava et al. (2010), two prominent examples where entrenchment resists 
shareholder opportunism are mitigations of bondholder risk arising from large dividend payout 
and leverage-increasing takeovers. They show that the likelihood of including covenants 
restricting dividend payout or takeover (shareholder opportunism-related covenants) is positively 




related to factors that weaken managerial entrenchment.3 The three-way interaction here implies 
that the interests of management are aligned with those of bondholders when an entrenched 
management dilutes shareholder opportunism. In bondholders’ view, it is precisely in these firms 
that stronger shareholder control is tantamount to too much shareholder power, making 
expropriation of bondholders more likely. Therefore, we expect a marginal rise in the riskiness of 
debt for these firms. This discussion leads to our third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3. Opportunism Resistance: By ameliorating managerial entrenchment, when 
entrenchment dilutes shareholder opportunism, stronger shareholder control indirectly increases 
the riskiness of debt.  
Theoretically all three channels coexist and are not mutually exclusive. Thus, the net effect, 
whether positive or negative, of stronger shareholder control on bondholders is a priori unclear 
and requires an empirical resolution. Accordingly, there are two competing predictions for the 
overall net effect. An increase in the riskiness of debt is consistent with the impact of the wealth 
redistribution channel as well as the opportunism resistance channel, whereas a decrease in 
riskiness of debt is in line with the effect of the management disciplining channel, suggesting 
that its effect is larger than the combined effects of wealth redistribution and opportunism 
resistance channels. 
 
3 Specifically, Chava et al. (2010) conclude that “[the] demand for dividend covenants is significantly and positively 
associated with shareholder power, and bondholders view managerial entrenchment as ameliorating shareholder 
agency risk for large dividend payout” (p.1135) and that “[for] bondholders, the primary agency risk during takeovers 
and financial distress situations is from shareholder opportunism…” (p.1138).   




B.  Dissecting the Channels 
Given that the simultaneous positive and negative effects of stronger shareholder control 
drive the complexity of their impact on bondholders, it is insightful to examine the relative 
importance of these opposing effects of increased shareholder control in driving the outcome of 
the three-way interaction. Particularly, we ask whether the observed overall effect is the result of 
one channel being just marginally stronger, or is there a dominating channel? We address this 
issue by using our conceptual framework and exploiting our sample’s cross-sectional variation in 
managerial entrenchment and shareholder-bondholder conflict measures to develop refutable 
hypotheses for subsets of our sample. Our framework allows us to focus on two extreme cases, 
where we can mute the impact of one channel and develop hypotheses about the effect of the 
others.  
In one extreme case, we mute the negative impact of the wealth redistribution channel, and 
we focus on firms where our framework suggests that the positive effect of more shareholder 
control on bondholders is stronger. Specifically, we focus on firms with existing high levels of 
shareholder-bondholder conflict. Given that for these firms the shareholder-bondholder conflict 
is already high, further escalation of this conflict due to increased shareholder control would not 
make the matter that much worse. Therefore, the marginal benefit of stronger shareholder 
control, through the management disciplining channel,  is larger than its marginal cost, and thus 
the reduction in the riskiness of debt should be larger for these firms.4 Moreover, as discussed 
 
4 We must note that this argument implicitly assumes that the marginal bondholder wealth expropriation effects of 
stronger shareholder control fall as the level of shareholder-bondholder conflict rises. In Section IX.A in the Internet 
Appendix, we justify this assumption using the Merton (1974) model of credit risk and provide the results of a 
simulation to further verify this assumption.  
 




earlier in the opportunism resistance hypothesis, the management disciplining effect is not 
universal and there are occasions where ameliorating entrenchment could have an adverse impact 
on bondholders. Therefore, in those occasions we expect to observe an offsetting effect. 
Specifically, we hypothesize the following. 
Hypothesis 4. Stronger shareholder control (a) reduces the riskiness of debt for firms that have 
high existing levels of shareholder-bondholder conflict, and (b) this risk reduction is attenuated 
for firms where entrenchment dilutes shareholder opportunism.  
In the other extreme case, we mute the effects of mitigating managerial entrenchment, i.e. 
disciplining management and opportunism resistance. We do this by focusing on firms with 
existing low levels of managerial entrenchment. It follows that mitigating managerial 
entrenchment for firms in which entrenchment is not a concern should have limited effects 
(direct and indirect), if any. For these firms, the combined marginal cost of escalating 
shareholder-bondholder conflict and shareholder opportunism is larger than the marginal benefit 
of ameliorating weak entrenchment. Therefore, in this case, stronger shareholder control 
increases the riskiness of debt.  
Hypothesis 5. Stronger shareholder control increases the riskiness of debt for firms that have low 
existing levels of managerial entrenchment. 
III.  Empirical Design and Data 
Our empirical design closely follows CGG’s, which follows the methodology developed by 
Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) to adapt a regression discontinuity design to an event 
study. In both studies, the identification strategy is based on the discontinuity in voting outcome 
(a corporate governance proposal in the former and issuing a bond targeted at a school facility 
investment in the latter) around the majority threshold, 50%. The outcome of the votes on 




shareholder proposals is nonbinding but, as shown in Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben (2010), 31.1% 
of shareholder proposals that pass are implemented, compared to only 3.2% of those not 
approved. Thus, these close-call proposals can be viewed as exogenous shifts in the corporate 
governance structure and can provide a unique setup that is very close to a randomized 
experiment that helps address endogeneity and establishes greater confidence in the causal 
interpretation of the effect of passing a governance proposal on the riskiness of debt, measured 
by adjusted CDS spreads.5 
Our dataset is an intersection of multiple data sources. We use governance-related 
shareholder proposals gathered by Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS), formerly known 
as RiskMetrics, from 1997 to 2011. ISS collects this data from the proxy statements of S&P 
1,500 firms as well as approximately 500 additional widely held companies. We require that 
none of the company names, voting dates, or vote results be missing. This yields a sample of 
5,082 proposals from 3,147 firm-meetings of 1,462 companies. We match the voting sample 
with Markit CDS Pricing to get the CDS spreads. Our daily CDS spread is from January 2001 to 
December 2011. The most common CDS on North American entities are for senior unsecured 
debt with five-year maturity and following so-called modified restructuring (frequently referred 
to as Mod R). We could match the CDS spreads for 2,718 proposals that were put to a vote at 
1,496 firm-meetings for 409 companies. Finally, we match the resulting sample to CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT to add share price and financial information.  
 
5 Please see Sections IX.B and IX.C in the Internet Appendix for more details about our regression discontinuity 
design. Specifically, we provide an overview of RDD (Section IX.B) and conduct some validity tests such as 
continuity in vote distribution (Section IX.C.1) and preexisting differences (Section IX.C.2 and Table A.6). 




We use the CDS to measure the riskiness of debt. Given the theoretical equivalence and 
economic comparability of CDS spreads and bond yield spreads as shown by Duffie (1999), one 
can argue that yield spread can be used – as it has been in the literature – to infer changes in the 
riskiness of debt. However, using CDS data has a number of advantages over using bond yield 
spreads. It is a well-established fact that bond yield spreads are at best a very noisy proxy for 
default probabilities since they include several nondefault premiums, namely liquidity and tax 
differential premiums.6 Thus, to the extent that CDS spreads proxy for default probabilities 
(Friewald et al. (2014)), their movements provide reliable and timely updates as the respective 
movements in the riskiness of debt of the corresponding reference entities. Moreover, following 
CGG, we classify shareholder proposals into six groups: auditors, board structure, compensation, 
antitakeover proposals (G-Index), voting, and other. Table A.1 in the Internet appendix 
summarizes these proposals.  
The number of observations increases over time due to the increase in coverage of both ISS 
and Markit CDS Pricing. The average vote outcome is 37.2%; out of 2,718 proposals in our 
sample, 28.5% passed. G-Index-related proposals constitute about 35% of the sample with the 
highest approval rate (more than half approved). Except for proposals in the voting category, 
other proposals have only very weak support among shareholders. Table A.2 in the Appendix 
provides detailed information on the voting percentages, average vote outcome, and number of 
votes in a window around the pass-threshold (50%) for the six main categories and all the ISS 
subcategories in our sample.  
 
6 In Section IX.D in the Internet Appendix, based on prior research, we outline different reasons as to why CDS spread 
is superior to bond yield spread in reflecting a firm’s credit risk. 




Table 1 displays the characteristics of the firms in our sample. The average CDS spread is 
136.16 bps, which is low compared to 209 bps, the average spread of all dollar-denominated 
CDSs on senior unsecured debt with five-year maturity and Mod R restructuring clauses from 
2001 to 2011. This is consistent with the average credit rating in our sample, BBB. Following the 
literature on CDS event studies (Jorion and Zhang (2007); Finnerty et al. (2013); Andres et al. 
(2017)), we use a rating-adjusted method to calculate an adjusted CDS spread change. A rating-
adjusted CDS spread change (ASCit) is: 
(1) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∆𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) − (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1)  
where Marketit is the average of all dollar-denominated CDSs on senior unsecured debt with 
five-year maturity for entities with the same credit rating as a firm. Cumulative Adjusted CDS 
Spread Change is the sum of the ASCit for a firm on voting day and one day after that. Average 
Cumulative Adjusted CDS Spread Change (0, 1) is 0.2 bps with standard deviation of 18.6 bps 
and is statistically insignificant.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
IV.  Main Results 
As we discuss in Section II, stronger shareholder control affects bondholders through three 
different channels that have opposite effects. Thus, the net effect is ex ante ambiguous and 
requires an empirical resolution. Employing regression discontinuity design, in this section we 
provide that empirical resolution and measure the overall net effect of stronger shareholder 
control on bondholders. The reported effect in this section can, therefore, be thought of as the 
sum of the positive and negative effects of management disciplining, wealth redistribution, and 
opportunism resistance channels.  




A.  Baseline Results  
Table 2 reports the difference in absolute cumulative adjusted CDS spreads of companies for 
which corporate governance proposals are narrowly passed and narrowly rejected from the 
election date to one day after.7 Column 1 shows that this difference is highly insignificant (with a 
p-value of 0.92) for the whole sample. When the market expects a governance proposal to pass 
(or fail) by a large margin, there is little uncertainty left for the day of voting since CDS spreads 
already reflect that expectation, resulting in no abnormal return on the election date. In Column 
2, the sample is restricted to proposals that are passed with fewer than 60% of votes or rejected 
with more than 40% of votes (within 10% of election threshold of 50%). As a result, the sample 
size drops from 2,718 to 776, reflecting the fact that the majority (71.4%) of proposals are passed 
(or rejected) by a large margin. Although still insignificant, the difference starts to widen to -
2.049 bps. Even though further restricting the sample to proposals with votes within 5% of the 
election threshold (Column 3) further cuts the sample size to almost half of that in Column 2 (or 
15% of the whole sample in Column 1), it nevertheless results in a larger and statistically 
significant difference in the adjusted CDS spread. Passing a corporate governance proposal here 
lowers the adjusted CDS spread by 4.040 bps (significant at the 1% level). This difference 
becomes larger when we narrow the interval even further around the election threshold to 2% 
and 1% (Columns 4 and 5), thus shrinking the sample size to only 170 and 105, respectively. 
 
7 Given that we suspect a slower market reaction due to lower liquidity of the CDS market compared to the equity 
market, unlike the CGG one-day window, we choose a two-day window. As dynamic specifications confirm our 
conjecture in Table 3, full market reaction takes longer than one day for the CDS spread, whereas the same table in 
CGG shows that the equity market reaction mostly happens in one day. 




Here, we find a drop of 4.060 bps and 5.169 bps, respectively, both statistically significant at 2% 
and 9%, respectively.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Finally, opening the window to the entire sample but controlling for distance to the threshold 
– by two separate polynomials of order six in the vote on each side of the threshold as described 
in Equation (A2) in the Appendix – in Column 6 gives a similar result. There is a highly 
significant drop (p-value < 0.01) in the adjusted CDS spread by 6.125 bps as a result of passage 
of a corporate governance proposal. For the average (median) firm in our sample, this is 
equivalent to a 4.5% (10%) drop. Using the theoretical comparability between CDS spreads and 
bond yield spreads (Duffie (1999)), a 6 bps drop in the spreads indicates a 0.3% increase in bond 
value that is equivalent to $31 million for an average firm in our sample. However, as noted by 
CGG, this estimate only reflects a change in the expectation of the proposal implementation as 
well as a change in the expectation of submission and implementation of future proposals. 
Ertimur et al. (2010) find that on average the probability that a passed proposal will be 
implemented is 31.1%. For proposals closer to the threshold, this probability increases by 20.7%, 
from 3.2% for failed proposals to 23.9% for proposals that pass. For a subset of G-related 
proposals, CGG estimate a discrete change in the implementation probability of 30.1% within 
two years, and within four years the probability is 50%. Given the estimated implementation 
probabilities by CGG and Ertimur et al. (2010),8 we estimate that the passage of a proposal 
reduces the risk to bondholders by between 12 and 25 bps, which indicates, respectively, an 
increase of 0.6% to 1.25% in debt value that is equivalent to about $62 to $129 million for an 
average firm in our sample. 
 
8 See Section IV.A.3 in CGG for more detail. 




B.  Dynamic Model with Vote Aggregation  
All 2,718 proposals in the sample were put to vote on 1,492 firm-meeting dates, indicating 
the fact that on some election dates more than one proposal was put to vote. Although the 
majority of the proposals were put to vote on meeting dates when there was only a single 
proposal on which to vote, there were also meeting dates when several proposals were put to 
vote. Table A.3 in the Internet appendix summarizes the distribution of the number of proposals 
per meeting and their voting outcome.   
This table shows that the number of proposals per meeting ranges from 1 to 9. One may 
expect a stronger impact of votes on the CDS spread as the number of passed proposals (or 
intensity of treatment) increases. Therefore, because of both the potential persistence of the 
impact and the possibility of the intensity of treatment effect, we need to go beyond the simple 
demonstration of data in Table 2 by (a) investigating the dynamics of this impact using a 
distributed lagged model over the days following an election date (as in Equation (A4)) to 
capture the potential persistence, and (b) aggregating the number of proposals that passed per 
firm-meeting and their corresponding vote shares (as in Equation (A5)) to incorporate the 
intensity of treatment. This task calls for combining Equations (A4) and (A5), resulting in 
Equation (A6), for which the estimation results are shown in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Results in Table 3 illustrate the effect of passing a proposal on the adjusted CDS spread on 
meeting date t (θτ in Equation (A6)); one day after the election date, or t + 1; and the cumulative 
effect from t + 2 to t + 7. What distinguishes the different columns in Table 3 is the set of fixed 
effect terms used in model specification. Given that here the window around an election 
threshold is open to include virtually the whole sample, as described earlier, the information 




contained in distance to threshold for votes on each meeting date is incorporated using separate 
polynomials in vote shares on each side of the threshold. The coefficients for each polynomial 
are allowed to vary for each of the lagged periods. 
Overall, we find that the net effect of passing a corporate governance proposal on the 
adjusted CDS spread is almost equally distributed over the first two days of an election. For 
example, in Column 3, which has the richest set of fixed effects, the CDS spreads drop by about 
2 bps on the day of an election. In all specifications, we can see that the declining pattern in CDS 
spreads is persistent.        
In sum, using a regression discontinuity design, we document the effect of passing a 
corporate governance proposal on the riskiness of debt that can more reliably be viewed as 
causal. This significant effect ranges between a 2.86 bps and a 6.12 bps drop in adjusted CDS 
spreads, depending on the model specification. Our results support the notion that strong 
shareholder control has a net positive impact on bondholders. 
C.  Evidence from Grouping the Proposals  
So far, our empirical evidence suggests that stronger shareholder control has a net positive 
impact on bondholders. CGG find that the positive effect of passing governance proposals on 
shareholders is mostly driven by takeover related proposals. Can this result be extended to 
bondholders? We provide empirical evidence that the opposite is true for bondholders: the drop 
in the riskiness of debt is mainly driven by the passage of nontakover-related proposals. 
1. Takeover versus Nontakover Proposals 
Theory makes opposing predictions about the impact of takeover-related proposals on 
bondholders. On the one hand, according to Jensen (1986), relaxing takeover restrictions 
strengthens the market for corporate control, which alleviates managerial entrenchment and 
reduces the riskiness of debt (decline in CDS spreads). On the other hand, studies by Kim and 




McConnell (1977), Cook and Martin (1991), Warga and Welch (1993), and Ghosh and Jain 
(2000) show that the increased likelihood of a takeover together with the increased likelihood of 
higher leverage due to the takeover increases the riskiness of debt (rise in CDS spreads). Thus, 
takeover-related proposals affect managerial entrenchment and shareholder-bondholder conflict 
in opposite directions, indicating that the net effect of the takeover-related proposals on CDS 
spreads is a priori ambiguous.  
Further, it may seem that the passage of nontakeover-related proposals improves monitoring 
of management and thereby mitigates entrenchment that benefits both shareholders and 
bondholders. As a result, unlike takeover-related proposals, the passage of nontakeover-
proposals should unambiguously lower the riskiness of debt. This view assumes that the passage 
of nontakeover proposals affects the riskiness of debt only through management disciplining. 
However, as we discuss in detail in the next section, Table A.2 shows that while there are 
nontakeover proposals, such as audit and board related, that affect riskiness of debt primarily 
through the management disciplining channel, there are other nontakeover proposals, such as 
compensation related, that impact riskiness of debt through both management disciplining and 
wealth redistribution channels. 9 All in all, it appears that there is no clear prediction by theory on 
the direction that the passage of takeover (G-Index-related) and nontakeover related (non-G-
Index related) proposals affect bondholders. 
Table 4 illustrates the estimation results for a modified version of Equation (A6) where we 
estimate separate coefficients for θs, and γs for G-Index (takeover-related) and non-G-Index 
 
9 In addition, as discussed earlier, Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2010) argue that due to the three-way interaction 
between management, shareholders, and bondholders, mitigating managerial entrenchment could also have a negative 
indirect effect on bondholders. 




(nontakover related) proposals. The upper panel of this table reports the CDS spread reaction to 
passing G-Index-related proposals, and the lower panel shows the same effect for non-G-Index 
proposals. In all three columns in Table 4 we can see that while CDS spreads decrease in 
response to the passing of both G-Index- and non-G-Index-related proposals, the drop is stronger 
 ̶  both statistically and economically   ̶ for non-G-Index-related proposals. In Column 3, for 
example, in a three-day window from t to t + 2, the CDS spread falls by only 2.6 for G-Index 
proposals (insignificant), whereas it drops by more than 9 bps for non-G-Index proposals.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
As tabulated in Table A.2, the list of non-G-Index-related proposals with greater numbers of 
votes around the majority threshold that are driving our results includes compensation-related 
(advisory vote on compensation and expense stock options), voting-related (majority vote to 
elect directors), board-related (separate chairman/CEO), and audit-related (limiting the 
consulting role of auditors) proposals. In contrast, CGG’s result is driven by G-Index proposals: 
delay-related (repeal classified board), voting-related (cumulative voting and eliminate 
supermajority), protection-related (vote on future golden parachutes), and other (redeem or vote 
on poison pill) proposals. Combined, these results show that while both shareholders and 
bondholders benefit from stronger shareholder rights, the benefit is channeled through 
improvement in external governance (takeover vulnerability) for shareholders, but through 
stronger internal governance (board independence, management compensation package, 
auditing, and voting rights) for bondholders. This result perhaps can be explained by the fact that 
unlike shareholders, bondholders have little upside potential but considerable downside risk. 
Therefore, nontakover proposals that limit downside risk by mitigating conflicts with 
management are more relevant to bondholders, whereas takeover related proposals that increase 




the exposure to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and lead to larger expected gains (e.g., larger 
purchase premiums) matter more to shareholders.10  
The results in this section are in line with previous findings in the literature. Results in 
Sengupta (1998); Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003); Anderson et al. (2004); Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2006); Fields et al. (2012); and Sunder et al. (2014) all indicate that changes in governance 
mechanisms that improve monitoring limit management from acting in its own self-interest and 
positively affect bondholders. According to this literature, a sound governance mechanism that 
limits management’s self-dealing behavior with better monitoring  ̶ by improving board 
independence, management compensation packages, independent audits, and voting rights ̶ 
reduces information asymmetry between the firm and external stakeholders and thus benefits 
bondholders.  
2.  Compensation versus Audit Board Proposals 
In the previous section, we provide evidence that the net positive effect on bondholders of 
stronger shareholder control is mainly driven by nontakeover- (non-G-Index) related proposals. 
However, there are nontakeover proposals that affect the riskiness of debt through management 
disciplining channel as well as wealth redistribution. In this subsection, we examine the effect of 
these nontakeover proposals. Specifically, we categorize these proposals into two groups: those 
that affect the riskiness of debt only through management disciplining channel and those that 
affect the riskiness of debt through both management disciplining and wealth redistribution 
 
10We thank Vicente Cuñat for pointing this out. 




channels.11 Given that our evidence shows that the net benefit to bondholders from stronger 
shareholder control is mainly driven by nontakeover-related proposals, we expect that the CDS 
spreads should decline for both groups; however, the drop should be larger for the proposal 
group that affects riskiness of debt only through the management disciplining channel. The net 
positive effect would be smaller for the other group because the negative effect of wealth 
redistribution channel offsets the positive effect of the management disciplining channel. 
We look for non-G-related proposals that can be argued to affect bondholders through both 
management disciplining and wealth redistribution channels. One may argue that compensation-
related proposals (such as those that link management compensation to equity value or 
performance) can exacerbate the conflict between shareholders and bondholders by aligning 
management to shareholders. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen and Murphy 
(1990), equity-based/linked compensation packages provide risk-shifting incentives for 
management. Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) attribute bankers’ excessive risk-taking behavior to 
high equity-linked executive compensation packages. Similarly, Chava et al. (2009) and Cremers 
et al. (2007) argue that shareholder friendly managers (CEOs with large equity-linked 
compensation packages) can escalate the shareholder-bondholder conflict. Fortin et al. (2014) 
also show that bondholders are adversely affected by incentive alignment through compensation-
related proposals. Therefore, while compensation-related proposals align shareholders and 
management, they can have an adverse effect on bondholders by increasing the conflict between 
shareholders and bondholders. Thus, we put these proposals in one group. In contrast, audit-
 
11 Due to the nature of these proposals, there is no proposal that affects only shareholder-bondholder conflict. In 
addition, data limitation does not allow us to split our sample based on proposal types. Therefore, we split them into 
the two aforementioned broader groups. 




related and board-related proposals mitigate managerial entrenchment and appear to have no 
significant impact on shareholder-bondholder conflict.12 We combine these proposals in the 
other group that affects the riskiness of debt only through the management disciplining channel. 
Results are reported in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
In all specifications, results show that CDS spreads significantly drop for both groups. 
However, consistent with our expectation, results are stronger for audit-board-related proposals. 
Subsequent to the passage of audit-board-related proposals, the drop in the CDS spreads 
continues to be significant for three days and amounts to about 21 bps. Following the passage of 
compensation-related proposals, the CDS spreads decline on the day and the day after the 
election for a total of about 5 bps. After that, the change becomes statistically insignificant.  
V.  Evidence from the Cross-Section 
In the previous sections, we provide empirical evidence that improvement in corporate 
governance has a net positive effect on bondholders. Given that the simultaneous positive and 
negative sides of stronger shareholder control drive the complexity of its effect on bondholders, 
in this section we compare the relative strength of the channels through which increased 
shareholder control affects the riskiness of debt. Is the observed overall positive effect reported 
in the previous sections, the result of management disciplining channel being just marginally 
stronger than wealth redistribution and tipping the overall effect in its direction or is it the 
dominating channel? Are there occasions where ameliorating entrenchment adversely affect 
bondholders as predicted by opportunism resistance hypothesis?  
 
12 Voting-related proposals also fall around the threshold, but they are excluded from our analysis because it is not 
clear whether they impact managerial entrenchment or shareholder-bondholder conflict.  




A.  Indirect Effect of Entrenchment 
In this section we test the opportunism resistance hypothesis. As discussed in Section II, 
according to the Chava et al. (2010) insight, the likelihood of including dividend payout and 
takeover covenants is positively related to factors that weaken managerial entrenchment. We 
collect the covenant information from the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) and Loan 
Pricing Corporation’s DealScan. FISD and DealScan contain information on more than 50 
covenants.  We construct a Dividend-Takeover index (DT) as the sum of indicators for the 
existence of these two covenants.13 Higher values of the index are associated with more exposure 
to shareholder opportunism.  
We estimate an augmented version of our dynamic model (Equation A6) by including 
interaction terms between DT and the pass dummy. As discussed before, opportunism resistance 
hypothesis suggests a marginal rise in the CDS spreads; thus, we expect positive coefficients on 
the interaction terms. Results are reported in Table 6. One day following the passage of a 
proposal, the interaction term is positive and statistically significant (coefficient = 2.59; p-value 
= 0.1), indicating a marginal rise in the CDS spreads. Focusing on the third column that has the 
richest set of fixed effects, an increase in DT from its lowest value of zero to its maximum of two 
raises the CDS spreads by about 5 basis points, offsetting the 8 basis point cumulative drop in the 
CDS spreads during the first two days following the passage of a proposal. Moreover, we see 
that all the other interaction terms in the other models (with one exception in Model 1) are also 
positive, though statistically insignificant. Overall, this result is consistent with the cross-
sectional prediction of opportunism resistance hypothesis that ameliorating entrenchment may 
 
13 Covenant data collection, aggregation, and the process of constructing the DT index are detailed in Section IX.F in 
the Internet Appendix. 




adversely affect bondholders on some occasions. It also adds to the evidence in Chava et al. 
(2010) and highlights the novel and sometimes counterintuitive implications of the three-way 
interaction between shareholders, bondholders, and management. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
B.  High-Conflict Firms: Direct Effect of Entrenchment  
Muting the negative impact of wealth redistribution channel, we test Hypothesis 4 in this 
section. We use prior research and theoretical guidelines for choosing variables as proxies for the 
level of shareholder-bondholder conflict. We posit that speculative credit ratings, high CEO 
ownership, high leverage, large dividend payout, and shrinking cash flows are characteristics of 
firms with existing high levels of shareholder-bondholder conflict.  
1. Credit Rating 
Firms with speculative ratings are more prone to risk-shifting concerns. As discussed earlier, 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the drop in CDS spreads is larger for firms with high existing levels of 
shareholder-bondholder conflict. Prior research also shows that improvement in governance 
structure is correlated with higher credit rating and lower yields (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006); 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003)). 
We collect credit rating data from COMPUSTAT (S&P Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit 
Rating) and split the sample into investment grade (BBB and above) and speculative issues 
(below BBB) and re-estimate a version of Equation (A6) for each subsample with firm fixed 
effects. The two columns associated with credit rating in Panel A of Table 7 report the results. 
We see that passing a corporate governance proposal has a negative but insignificant effect on 
the CDS spread for investment-grade firms, whereas it leads to a drop in CDS spread for firms 
with speculative ratings that are both statistically and economically significant. The CDS spread 
drops by 5.21 bps on the voting day, 6.14 bps a day later, and by 8.04 bps two days after the 




voting day  ̶  a total drop of nearly 19 bps that is statistically significant at 1% (rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the total drop over the three days following the vote is zero).  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
2. CEO Ownership 
Based on Jensen and Meckling (1976), the conventional view in corporate finance is that by 
aligning the interest of management to that of shareholders, greater CEO ownership mitigates 
managerial entrenchment; however, it can also elevate wealth transfer concerns for bondholders. 
Similarly, Cremers et al. (2007) and Chava et al. (2009) point out that managers with large stock 
ownership can exacerbate shareholder-bondholder conflict. Thus, such CEOs can be 
characterized as shareholder friendly. Therefore, we argue that higher CEO ownership can 
intensify the shareholder-bondholder conflict. Hypothesis 4 would then suggest that the drop in 
CDS spreads is larger for firms with high CEO ownership.  
We collect the CEO ownership data from Executive Comp and rank the sample based on 
CEO ownership, defined as the percentage of company shares owned by the CEO. The two 
columns associated with CEO ownership in Panel A of Table 7 compare the estimation results 
for companies with low CEO ownership (bottom quartile) and for those with high CEO 
ownership (top quartile). Results show that passing a corporate governance proposal in 
companies with high CEO ownership lowers the adjusted CDS spread by 4.28 bps on the voting 
day, 3.97 bps a day after, 5.02 bps two days after, and 11.94 bps three days after the voting day  ̶  
a total drop of 25.2 bps, which is significant at 3%. (This rejects the null hypothesis that the total 
drop over the three days following the vote is zero.) In contrast, for companies with low CEO 
ownership, the change in adjusted CDS spread is insignificant.   




3.  Leverage 
The incentive to expropriate wealth from bondholders to increase the value to shareholders 
increases with leverage. Therefore, the conflict between shareholders and bondholders is high for 
firms with high leverage (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Hypothesis 4 suggests that for these 
firms the drop in CDS spreads is expected to be larger. 
The two columns associated with leverage in Panel A of Table 7 report the results for firms 
in the bottom and the top quartiles of leverage. We find that the drop in CDS spreads after the 
passage of a proposal is much more pronounced for high-leverage firms. For these firms, the 
total drop in CDS spreads over three days after voting is about 34 bps (statistically significant at 
2% and therefore rejects the null hypothesis that the total drop over the three days following the 
vote is zero) whereas the drop is insignificant for low-levered firms.  
4.  Dividend and Cash Flow Growth 
Management of a firm’s internal resources is a major source of conflict between different 
stakeholders of a firm (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Jensen (1986)). To avoid market exposure, 
management may allocate these resources to finance empire building or self-dealing, which 
would be detrimental to both shareholders and bondholders. Management also has an incentive 
to expropriate wealth from bondholders to shareholders (Merton (1974); Jensen and Meckling 
(1976); Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006)). Paying large dividends to shareholders is one mechanism 
to expropriate wealth from bondholder to shareholders.14 Sufficiently large dividends can 
significantly increase the default risk and are usually a concern to bondholders (Chava et al. 
(2010)). Therefore, the conflict between shareholders and bondholders is more pronounced for 
 
14  Hu and Kumar (2004) show that managers may pay high dividends to reduce shareholders’ motive for the 
termination of the manager’s employment. 




firms that pay high dividends. Similarly, declining cash flows can also increase the firm’s default 
risk; as a firm’s default risk increases, so does the conflict between shareholders and 
bondholders. Hypothesis 4 suggests that for both of these firms the drop in CDS spread is larger.  
In Panel A of Table 7, the pairs of columns associated with dividend and cash flow (CF) 
growth report the results. Dividends and CF growth are calculated using a rolling three-year 
average. The columns associated with dividends compare the top and bottom quartiles of 
dividends. For CF growth, results compare the CDS reaction of firms with positive cash flow 
growth (expanding CF) with firms with negative growth (shrinking CF). Consistent with 
Hypothesis 4, results show that the drop in CDS spreads is much more pronounced for high 
dividend-paying firms and for firms with negative CF growth. Subsequent to the passage of a 
proposal, CDS spreads drop by 7.5 bps (5.2 bps) on the day of the vote for high dividend 
(shrinking cash flow) companies. In the four days following the vote, CDS spreads drop by a 
total of 21.86 bps (20.87 bps) for high dividend (shrinking cash flow) firms (These estimates are 
statistically significant at 1% and reject the null hypothesis that the total drop over the three days 
following the vote is zero.) In contrast, CDS spread drop is insignificant for low dividend-paying 
firms and for firms with expanding cash flows (positive cash flow growth). 
C.  High-Conflict Firms: Indirect Effect of Entrenchment  
In the previous section, we provided evidence consistent with the first part of Hypothesis 4, 
that stronger shareholder control leads to a larger drop in the CDS spreads for firms with high 
existing levels of shareholder-bondholder control. In this section, we examine the second part of 
Hypothesis 4, that the reduction in the CDS spreads is not universal and show that ameliorating 
entrenchment can increase CDS spreads through its indirect negative effect.  




We augment our analysis in the previous section by including an interaction term between 
the DT and the pass dummy. The second part of Hypothesis 4 predicts positive coefficients on 
the interaction terms. Results are reported in Panel B of Table 7. We can see that the main result 
of Panel A is robust to inclusion of the interaction term.  Consistent with Panel A, the drop in 
CDS spreads is larger for firms with high existing levels of shareholder-bondholder conflicts, 
e.g. firms with low credit rating, high CEO ownership, high leverage, large dividend payout, and 
shrinking cash flows. Moreover, we find evidence consistent with the second part of Hypothesis 
4. Whenever statistically significant, the interaction terms are positive and belong to the high 
shareholder-bondholder conflict categories. For example, the result for the high CEO ownership 
category shows that the drop in the CDS spreads of these firms are offset by about 2 basis points 
in two days following the passage of the proposals, 7 basis points in three days, and 6 basis 
points in four days. To summarize, the cumulative 42 basis point drop in the CDS spreads of 
these firms during the four days following the passage of the proposals (t + 1 to t + 4) is offset by 
about 15 basis points. That means for a firm with high CEO ownership that does not use any 
shareholder-opportunism related covenant, the drop in its CDS spread is about 15 basis points 
larger compared to a firm with one such covenant. Except for the low credit rating category, we 
find similar results (but with varying magnitude and statistical significance) for other categories. 
For the high leverage category, the 17 basis point drop in CDS spread in day four is cut almost 
by half if a shareholder-opportunism related covenant is used. During the first four days 
following the passage of proposals (t to t + 3), the decline in CDS spreads of firms with 
shrinking cash flows that have one shareholder-opportunism related covenant is 11 basis points 
smaller than that of a firm without such covenants, for which the drop is about 35 basis points. 
A15 basis point drop in CDS spreads of high dividend paying firms in the first two days 




following the passage of the proposal (t to t + 1) is offset by 1 basis point if a shareholder-
opportunism related covenant is used.  
Overall, these results show that while stronger shareholder control lowers the overall risk to 
bondholders due to its disciplining effect, this reduction in risk is partially offset in firms where 
entrenchment dilutes shareholder opportunism. Moreover, the fact that the coefficients on the 
interaction terms are smaller than those of the pass dummies suggests that the indirect adverse 
effect of ameliorating entrenchment on bondholders is secondary to its direct positive effect. The 
result of this section is consistent with the indirect adverse effect of ameliorating managerial 
entrenchment on bondholders. Together, the results of Table 6 and Panel B of Table 7 verify the 
validity of opportunism resistance channel and its cross-sectional implication. 
D.  Low Managerial Entrenchment   
In this section, we examine the other extreme case, where the negative effect of stronger 
shareholder control on bondholders is expected to be stronger. Specifically, in this section we 
test Hypothesis 5. We focus on firms with low existing level of managerial entrenchment. To 
measure the magnitude of managerial entrenchment we use E-Index, CEO duality, length of 
CEO tenure, and acquisitions.  
1.  E-Index 
E-Index, or entrenchment index, developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009), uses staggered board, 
limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority 
requirements for mergers and charter amendments to measure entrenchment. A large E-Index 




implies a high level of managerial entrenchment. Using the median of E-Index15 in our sample, 
we split the sample into high E-Index and low E-Index. Results are reported in the two columns 
associated with E-Index in Table 8. We do not find evidence consistent with Hypothesis 5. 
Focusing on the low E-Index column, all the coefficients are statistically insignificant and in 
most cases with the opposite sign from what Hypothesis 5 predicts.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
2.  CEO Tenure 
A CEO with a long tenure has the opportunity to institute changes in the firm’s structure to 
increase his/her entrenchment (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1989) show that longer tenure allows for CEOs’ self-dealing. Therefore, CEOs with longer 
tenure are more likely to be entrenched. We follow Chava et al. (2010) and use the length of 
CEO tenure as a factor associated with entrenchment. Hypothesis 5 suggests a rise in the CDS 
spreads for firms with CEOs who have (relatively) shorter tenure (low entrenchment) subsequent 
to the passage of a shareholder-sponsored proposal.   
Our tenure data is collected from Executive Comp. We split the sample into two groups: 
firms with CEOs with tenure length of less than four years and with CEOs with tenure length of 
four years or more.16 Focusing on the column labeled “Tenure < 4yr” in Table 8, we see that the 
findings do not support our hypothesis. Similar to the results for E-Index, all coefficients are 
insignificant; and with one exception, they all have the wrong sign (opposite to what our 
hypothesis suggests).  
 
15 We use the data available on Professor Lucian Bebchuk’s website until 2006. For years after 2006, we use the ISS 
(RiskMetrics) database (more specifically, its Governance database) and manually construct the index by adding six 
dummies for the six categories. The median E-Index of our sample is three. 
16 We also split our sample using tenure length of five years. Results are virtually the same. 




3.  CEO Duality 
Boards have a fiduciary duty to protect the interests of shareholders. This role requires 
independence and effectiveness. When a CEO is also the chairman of the board, the 
independence and effectiveness of the board is fundamentally undermined, which exacerbates 
entrenchment (Jensen (1993); Boyd (1994)). Following Chava et al. (2010), we use CEO duality 
as a measure of entrenchment. Hypothesis 5 implies that increasing shareholder control for firms 
without CEO duality should lead to an increase in the CDS spreads of these firms following the 
passage of a proposal. 
We collect the data on CEO duality from the Director database of ISS (RiskMetrics) and split 
the sample into two groups: firms with and without CEO duality. Looking at firms without CEO 
duality, we see that all coefficients are insignificant with a negative sign, contradicting our 
hypothesis.  
4.  Acquisition 
As argued by Chava et al. (2010), empire building is a factor that is particularly associated 
with entrenchment. The reason is that the main form of empire building is by expanding the 
firm’s assets through value-destroying acquisition. Therefore, acquisition is a common variable 
to proxy for empire building and, by association, for entrenchment. Thus, we use firms’ 
acquisitions as a proxy for entrenchment. For firms with low acquisition activities (low 
entrenchment), increasing shareholder control alleviates managerial entrenchment where 
entrenchment is low. Thus, Hypothesis 5 suggests that the CDS spreads should rise for these 
firms. 
Firm’s acquisition data are collected from COMPUSTAT. Using the median acquisition 
volume scaled by total assets, we split the sample into high and low acquisition activity groups. 
Consistent with earlier findings, we find that for firms with low acquisition activity, all 




coefficients are insignificant; with one exception, they have negative signs, opposite to what 
Hypothesis 5 predicted. 
Our interpretation of the results in this subsection is that the marginal positive effect of 
ameliorating managerial entrenchment is large enough to offset its marginal negative impact on 
shareholder-bondholder conflict, rendering insignificant coefficients with negative signs. A 
conservative interpretation of these results is that the increase in the costs  ̶  both direct and 
indirect  ̶  of stronger shareholder control to bondholders is not large enough to overshadow the 
benefits of lowering managerial entrenchment, even where those benefits are expected to be 
minimal. 
Overall, our cross-sectional evidence confirms our baseline results and is consistent with 
Hypothesis 4 but inconsistent with Hypothesis 5. We show that in occasions where entrenchment 
dilutes shareholder opportunism, ameliorating managerial entrenchment has an indirect adverse 
impact on bondholders. However, our evidence suggests that the marginal benefit of 
ameliorating entrenchment is larger than its indirect adverse effect. To summarize, results seem 
to indicate that the positive impact of the management disciplining channel is larger than the 
direct negative effect of the wealth redistribution channel and the indirect adverse impact of the 
opportunism resistance channel combined.   
However, our cross-sectional results have an alternative interpretation that we cannot 
completely rule out. While we consistently show there is a net positive effect on bondholders of 
stronger shareholder control, the effect exists only for firms with speculative credit ratings, large 
CEO ownership, high leverage, those who pay high dividends, and those with shrinking cash 
flows. Speculative credit rating, high leverage, and shrinking cash flows are characteristics of 
firms that are either financially distressed or on the path of becoming so. Bondholders of 




companies that are well distanced from default are more confident about receiving their coupon 
payments. Their position is not significantly enhanced by increased shareholder control, and 
therefore they are not concerned with changes in corporate governance structure. This means 
improvements in corporate governance mainly matters for firms that are closer to default. This 
interpretation is consistent with the findings in Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) and Klock et al. 
(2005), who argue that bondholders’ benefits from improvement in corporate governance should 
be larger for firms closer to default. Further, our framework implies that addressing 
entrenchment where entrenchment is high should lead to a pronounced reduction in the CDS 
spreads of these firms. The insignificant coefficients for firms with high existing levels of 
entrenchment (high E-Index, a tenure length of more than four years, and with CEO duality) add 
credibility to the alternative interpretation. Nevertheless, consistent with our framework, we do 
find a large drop in CDS spreads of firms with high acquisition activities. As discussed earlier, 
high acquisition activities could proxy for entrenched management (Chava et al., 2010). 
Moreover, while this alternative interpretation can be easily argued for firms with speculative 
credit rating, high leverage, and shrinking cash flows, there is no reason to believe that firms 
with high CEO ownership and high dividends are necessarily close to default. Therefore, while 
we cannot completely refute the alternative interpretation of the cross-sectional results, we do 
have some evidence suggesting that the positive effect on bondholders of stronger shareholder 
control is not exclusively relevant to risky and close-to-default firms. It is also important to note 
that the alternative interpretation is about where the positive effect is manifested and not about 
its existence. 




VI.  Robustness Checks  
In this section we conduct a series robustness test. Specifically, we control for the effect 
equity returns to ensure that our finding is not a mechanical effect of positive equity return 
documented by CGG. To alleviate the concern that rating-adjusted spreads may produce 
inconsistent estimates, we conduct our analysis using unadjusted CDS spreads with rating fix 
effects. Next, we address the vote manipulation concerns raised by Bach and Metzger (2019) 
which would invalidate random-assignment assumption of RDD. Finally, we address the sample 
selection bias caused by using CDS firms (Subrahmanyam et al. (2014a)) in two way; first, by 
comparing our sample financial- and governance-related characteristics with those of public 
firms (in the COMPUSTAT universe) during the sample period; second, and more formally, by 
employing a Heckman (1979) type self-selection model (similar to Subramanyam et al. (2014a)) 
in conjunction with RDD design. Overall, results of these analyses confirm our main findings. 
These analyses are discussed in detail in Section IX.G in the internet appendix.  
VII.  Further Discussion 
A.  Long-Run Effects of Governance Proposals 
In this section, we investigate whether the decline in the riskiness of debt documented in 
previous sections is consistent with the evolution of factors affecting the risk over the long term 
and provide some evidence for the long-term impact of a governance change on firms. In 
particular, we are interested in determining whether a drop in CDS spreads over the days 
following the passage of a proposal is indicative of long-term improvements in variables 
affecting credit risk as well as in operating performance measures. In doing so, we use the model 
specification in Equation (A3) for which the treatment indicator is aggregated as in Equation 




(A5) with separate polynomials of order four on each side of the threshold. Results are reported 
in Table 9. 
The reported coefficients in Table 9 estimate the difference between changes in a set of 
variables for proposals that pass and those that fail by a small margin over the years after an 
election date. Each coefficient corresponds to a separate regression for each year and reports the 
cumulative effect of governance improvement on each outcome variable since the voting year. 
Focusing on the first column, the dependent variable in all models is a credit rating index, which 
is equal to 1 for “D” rated bonds and increases to 22 for “AAA” bonds where every rating 
category is divided into three notches using plus and minus signs. We observe on the first row 
that one year after election, the difference is positive but statistically insignificant. However, 
starting from the second year, the difference becomes positive and increasingly significant until 
year t + 5. For example, in the second row we see that two years after the election the average 
credit rating increases by about half a notch. Notice that improvements in firms’ ratings after a 
governance proposal is passed follow an increasing pattern and stay significantly away from 
zero. Therefore, we conclude that the long-term real effect of passing governance proposals 
materializes as improvement in credit rating, indicating lower probability of default. This is 
consistent with the short-term drop in CDS spread that we documented in previous sections.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Similarly, in Columns 2 to 7 we find evidence supporting lower riskiness of debt due to 
improvement in financial risk indicators, better operating performance, and an increase in cash 
flow. The results in Columns 2 to 4 show that in one year after election, z-score improves by 
0.107 (equivalent to a 6% increase for a typical firm in our sample), while both leverage ratio 
and average interest rate on debt significantly drop  ̶  all consistent with lower riskiness of debt 




for the company. Moreover, improvements in operating performance that ultimately result in a 
significant increase in the cash-flow level further lowers the riskiness of debt. Columns 5 to 7 
illustrate this assertion. The significant increase of 0.011 in cash-flow-to-assets ratio (equivalent 
to a 24% increase for a typical firm in our sample) is driven by both a boost in the sales growth 
rate (Column 5) and an increase in ROA (Column 6).  
Results in Columns 8 and 9 offer suggestive evidence that is consistent with alleviation rather 
than escalation of the conflict between bondholders and shareholders. If shareholders with 
stronger control decide to use their additional power to maximize their share value through risk 
shifting by investing in riskier projects at the expense of bondholders, then both cash-flow 
growth volatility and stock-price volatility are expected to increase to reflect elevated risk levels. 
However, the results in Columns 8 and 9 show the opposite. We find a 0.004 drop in cash-flow 
growth volatility one year after the election. This is equivalent to a 24% drop for a typical firm in 
our sample. The drop in cash-flow growth volatility continues to be statistically significant for 
three years after the vote. Moreover, we find a statistically significant drop of 0.025 (equivalent 
to 1.2% for a typical firm in our sample) in stock price volatility, measured by the absolute value 
of the stock return one year after the vote, and the drop continues to be significant in the second 
year. It is well known from the theoretical credit risk literature that a lower leverage ratio reduces 
equity volatility, even if asset volatility remains constant (e.g., Merton (1974); Leland (1994)). 
Therefore, it is important to control for leverage in stock price volatility estimation. Controlling 
for leverage, we find that the result for stock price volatility remains almost identical. 
Overall, consistent with the drop in adjusted CDS spreads on and during the days following 
the passage of governance proposals, we find long-term improvement in operating performance, 
financial risk, and credit-risk profile of the companies in our sample. These results indicate that 




even in the long-run, the net effect of stronger shareholder control on bondholders is positive. 
The fact that credit agencies upgrade their credit ratings and lenders charge a lower rate in the 
years following the election is indicative of actual changes in governance structure that has 
resulted in lower risk assessment by external monitors.  
B.  Comparison to Prior Findings  
At first glance, our result showing that the passage of G-related proposals has no significant 
impact on bondholders seems inconsistent with the literature that views takeover as another risk 
factor to bondholders (Kim and McConnell (1977); Shleifer and Vishny (1986); Cook and 
Martin (1991); Warga and Welch (1993); Ghosh and Jain (2000)). We argue that the impact on 
bondholders of the passage of G-related (antitakeover) proposals is a priori ambiguous due to the 
two opposite effects of increased shareholder control: the benefit of mitigating managerial 
entrenchment vis-à-vis the negative effect of wealth transfer. Thus, the insignificant coefficient 
for G-Index-related proposals in Table 4 implies that when the goal of increasing shareholder 
control is to enhance the market for corporate control, the adverse effect of the proposal 
(takeover risk) offsets the potential gains to bondholders. This interpretation is in line with prior 
findings in the literature.  
In addition to the above argument, our seemingly inconsistent findings can be reconciled by 
the insights provided by Cremers et al. (2007). They show that the impact of shareholder 
governance on bondholder risk depends on the governance mechanism already in place. They 
highlight the moderating role of the existing governance mechanisms and examine the effect of 
their interactions on bondholders. They argue that depending on takeover vulnerability, strong 
shareholder control can increase or decrease yield spreads. They find that strong shareholder 
control increases (decreases) spreads if the firm is exposed to (protected from) takeover. In our 




baseline estimation, we do not condition on takeover vulnerability. Therefore, these opposing 
effects could offset each other and may be the reason for the insignificant coefficient. In fact, for 
the subset of our dataset for which G-Index is available, conditioning our estimation on G-Index 
produces results consistent with those of Cremers et al. (2007). (G-Index can be used as a proxy 
for takeover vulnerability, with higher G indicating lower takeover vulnerability.) This result is 
reported in Table A.4 in the Internet Appendix. We find that for companies with G-Indexes 
above the median (G ≥ 10), the passage of shareholder proposals reduces bondholder risk by 
3.66 bps, whereas for firms with G-Indexes below the median (G ≤ 9), bondholder risk increases 
by 1.84 bps.  
Moreover, the absence of an effect of the passage of G-Index-related proposals on CDS 
spreads seems to be in contradiction to the results in Klock et al. (2005) and Chava et al. (2009). 
These two studies show that governance improvement (defined in terms of lower antitakeover 
provisions) leads to an increase in spreads. Klock et al. (2005) find a negative relationship 
between bond yield spread and G-Index. Using the G-Index, Chava et al. (2009) show that firms 
with lower antitakeover provisions pay more for their bank loans. However, we find that the 
passage of G-Index-related proposals has no impact on bondholders. In fact, our results indicate 
that strong shareholder control has a net positive impact on bondholders. To understand the 
source of this difference, we look for differences between our study and theirs in terms of sample 
and empirical methodology. 
Klock et al. (2005) regress bond yield spreads on G-Index, whereas we employ RDD. In fact, 
when we follow their methodology by regressing CDS spreads on G-Index, we find a significant 
negative coefficient that is comparable to theirs. This result is reported in Table A.5 in the 
Internet Appendix. Also, as discussed above, the insignificant coefficient for the G-Index-related 




proposal is a manifestation of the trade-off that bondholders face. When a proposal has an 
adverse impact on bondholders, which is likely to be the case for G-Index-related proposals, the 
benefit of strong shareholder control is diminished.  
Results in the study by Chava et al. (2009) are mainly driven by low-leverage firms and those 
that are of better credit risk at the time of loan origination. However, our results are mainly 
driven by firms with high leverage and speculative-grade credit rating. Thus, the inconsistency 
between our findings and theirs could be an artifact of the differences in our samples, making it 
specifically imperative to compare the leverage ratios between our samples. This comparison 
shows that we have almost identical leverage ratios of 29%. Moreover, our sample is dominated 
by investment-grade bonds: 75% investment versus 25% speculative. This leads us to the second 
source of difference: the empirical methodology. As pointed out above, when we follow the 
methodology of Klock et al. (2005) and Chava et al. (2009) and regress CDS spreads on G-
Index, we confirm their findings. (See Table A.5 in the Internet Appendix.) 
We conclude that the inconsistencies between our results and those of prior studies can be 
attributed at least in part to the difference in our empirical designs. Although RDD is subject to 
the standard criticism of identifying only the local average treatment effect, it is a widely used 
method in corporate finance research and is deemed superior in establishing a causal inference. 
VIII.  Conclusion 
Exploiting the discontinuity in the probability of implementing shareholder-sponsored 
proposals around the majority threshold, we use an RDD and estimate the effect of 
improvements in corporate governance on bondholders. We show that passage of a governance-
related proposal reduces default risk. On average, the adjusted CDS spreads decline by 12 to 25 
bps in a two-day window around the voting date. Confirming the existence of the indirect 




adverse effect of ameliorating entrenchment, the reported positive effect is attenuated where 
entrenchment dilutes shareholder opportunism.  
In the cross-section, we show that the benefit from increased shareholder control is stronger 
where the conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders is higher, i.e., firms with 
noninvestment credit rating, with high CEO ownership, with high leverage, those who pay high 
dividends, and for those with shrinking cash flows. Further, we provide evidence that even for 
these firms the pronounced drop in CDS spreads is offset due to the indirect adverse impact on 
bondholders of mitigating entrenchment. However, we do not find an increase in CDS spreads as 
a result of stronger shareholder control even where the marginal benefit of mitigating managerial 
entrenchment is low. These results suggest that the benefit of addressing managerial 
entrenchment is larger than the combined direct negative effect of wealth transfer and the 
indirect adverse effect of alleviating entrenchment caused by increased shareholder control; at 
the very least, they imply that the negative sides of increased shareholder control are secondary 
to the gains resulting from mitigating managerial entrenchment.  
Moreover, splitting the proposals into takeover- and nontakeover-related, we find that CDS 
market reaction is mainly driven by nontakeover-related proposals. This contrasts with CGG, 
who find that takeover-related (G-Index-related) proposals drive stock market reactions. 
Focusing on nontakeover-related (non-G-Index-related) proposals, we show that results are much 
more pronounced for proposal types that only mitigate entrenchment without escalating 
shareholder-bondholder conflict (audit- and board-related proposals) and are muted for proposals 
that simultaneously mitigate entrenchment and exacerbate shareholder-bondholder conflict 
(compensation-related proposals). Moreover, consistent with the short-run reaction of the CDS 
market, in years following an election we find improvement in credit rating, z-score, and 




operational performance while leverage ratio, cost of debt, cash flow volatility, and stock price 
volatility decline. Overall, our findings suggest that by mitigating entrenchment, increasing 
shareholder control benefits all stakeholders and thereby reduces the riskiness of debt and hence 
has a net positive effect on bondholders. 
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FIGURE 1  
A Graphical Representation of our Conceptual Framework 
 
 







Our sample consists of 2,718 proposals from 1,496 firm-year observations. The CDS Spread is the spread of CDSs for a firm’s five-year senior unsecured 
debt with a modified restructuring clause in basis point (Markit). Cumulative Adjusted CDS Spread Change is the sum of the Adjusted CDS Spread Change 
on voting day and one day after (Markit). Stock Abnormal Returns are computed using the Fama–French and momentum factors (CRSP). Accounting 
variables are from COMPUSTAT: Total Asset, Leverage Ratio, ROA, Interest Coverage and Credit Rating Index. We assign numbers from 1 to 22 to the 
S&P bond ratings (D to AAA). 
  Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. 5th Per. 95th Per. 
CDS_SPREAD (bps) 1,496 136.16 59.89 283.20 13.64 467.96 
CUMM_ADJ_CDSSPRD_CHNG  1,489 0.20 0.00 18.60 -10.98 12.03 
STOCK_ABRETURN_ONMEET_DAY 1,496 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.03 
ASSET ($millions) 1,494 82,047.63 22,114.73 210,587.80 3,092.78 410,063.20 
LEVERAGE 1,492 0.29 0.27 0.20 0.06 0.60 
ROA 1,494 0.04 0.04 0.10 -0.04 0.14 
INT_COVRAGE_RATIO 1,418 0.56 0.22 3.49 0.00 1.06 
CREDIT_RATING_INDEX 1,461 15.19 15.00 3.04 9.00 20.00 
 
TABLE 2 
Adjusted CDS Spread Response to Governance Proposals around the Majority Threshold 
This table presents regression results of the cumulative adjusted change in CDS spreads from the day of the meeting t = 0 to the next day 
t = 1 in response to passage of a governance proposal. Adjusted CDS spreads are calculated using a rating-adjusted method. The model 
specification for Columns 1-5 is given in Equation (A1) and for Column 6 in Equation (A2). Column 1 estimates are based on the whole 
sample. Column 2 restricts the sample to observations with a vote share within 10 points of the threshold; Columns 3 to 5 restrict the sample 
to 5, 2, and 1 points of the threshold, respectively. Column 6 uses the full sample (winsorized at 1% and 99%) by introducing a polynomial 
in the vote share of order 6, one on each side of the threshold. All columns control for year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm. p-values are reported in parentheses, and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Cumulative Changes in Adjusted CDS Spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All Votes −10; +10  −5; +5 −2; +2 −1; +1 Full Model 
Pass -0.1280 -2.049 -4.040*** -4.060** -5.169* -6.125*** 
 (0.9200) (0.160) (0.010) (0.020) (0.090) (0.000) 
R2 0.0102 0.010 0.034 0.065 0.082 0.018 
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Adjusted CDS Spread for G-Related versus Non-G-Related Proposals 
 This table compares the regression of changes in adjusted CDS spreads on the passage of G-
Index versus non-G-Index (other) proposals. The dependent variable is the adjusted CDS 
spreads that are calculated using a rating-adjusted method. The model specification is given in 
Equation (A6). The upper (lower) panel illustrates the effect of G-Index (other) proposals on 
the adjusted CDS spread. All columns use seven separate polynomials of order 6 to control for 
the effect of any determinant of changes in adjusted CDS spreads that are continuous in vote 
share. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are reported in parentheses and 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Cumulative Adjusted CDS Spread 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 G-Index G-Index G-Index 
DAY_OF_VOTE, t -0.874 -0.669 -0.781 
 (0.180) (0.280) (0.570) 
ONE_DAY_LATER, t + 1 -1.366 -1.096 -1.224 
 (0.240) (0.360) (0.520) 
TWO_DAYS_LATER, t + 2 -0.974 -0.660 -0.613 
 (0.120) (0.310) (0.670) 
DAYS t + 3 to t + 7 2.115 2.758 1.789 







DAY_OF_VOTE, t -1.979*** -2.306*** -3.489*** 
 (0.010) 0.00 0 (0.010) 
ONE_DAY_LATER, t + 1 -1.739* -2.183** -3.096**  
 (0.050) (0.020) (0.040) 
TWO_DAYS_LATER, t + 2 -1.365 -1.777* -2.463*   
 (0.150) (0.090) (0.080) 
DAYS t + 3 to t + 7 -5.345 -6.710 -14.113 
 (0.270) (0.150) (0.140) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect  Yes  
Firm -Meeting Fixed Effect   Yes 
Distance to Election Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.014  0.032  0.099  
Observations 11,376  11,376  11,376  
This table presents the effect of passing a proposal on changes in the adjusted CDS spread on the meeting date (t), one 
day after (t + 1), and the cumulative effect from t + 2 to t + 7. The dependent variable is the adjusted CDS spreads that 
are calculated using a rating-adjusted method. The model specification is given in Equation (A6). All columns use seven 
separate polynomials of order six to control for the effect of any determinant of changes in adjusted CDS spreads that 
is continuous in vote share. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are reported in parentheses, and significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Changes in Adjusted CDS Spread Using All Proposals 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) 
DAY_OF_VOTE, t -1.324** -1.363** -1.790* 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.090) 
ONE_DAY_LATER, t + 1 -1.535* -1.585* -1.907 
 (0.090) (0.080) (0.190) 
DAYS t + 2 to t + 7 -2.269 -2.645 -5.734 
 (0.230) (0.220) (0.250) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect  Yes  
Firm-Meeting Fixed Effect   Yes 
Distance to Election Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.008 0.039 0.131 
Observations 11,338 11,338 11,338 





Adjusted CDS Spread for Compensation-Related versus Audit-Board Proposals 
This table compares the regression of changes in adjusted CDS spreads on the passage of compensation-related and audit- and board-
related proposals. The dependent variable is the adjusted CDS spreads that are calculated using a rating-adjusted method. The model 
specification is given in Equation (A6). The left (right) panel illustrates the effect of compensation-related (audit- board-related) 
proposals on the adjusted CDS spread. All columns use seven separate polynomials of order six to control for the effect of any 
determinant of changes in adjusted CDS spreads that are continuous in vote share. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are 
reported in parentheses and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Panel A: Compensation Proposals Panel B: Audit and Board Proposals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DAY_OF_VOTE, t -1.810** -1.908** -2.585**  -2.165** -2.324** -4.619**   
(0.020) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
ONE_DAY_LATER, t + 1 -1.874** -2.094** -2.590**  -4.850*** -5.516*** -7.393***  
(0.020) (0.010) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TWO_DAYS_LATER, t + 2 -0.246 -0.545 -1.124 -2.520 -2.823 -4.384*    
(0.780) (0.580) (0.340) (0.210) (0.200) (0.090) 
THREE_DAYS_LATER, t + 3 -1.011 -1.057 -2.000 -1.234 -1.233 -5.064*   
 (0.350) (0.400) (0.210) (0.220) (0.290) (0.070) 
DAYS t + 4 to t + 7 3.622 3.624 0.655 -10.638 -10.767 -20.237 
 (0.480) (0.620) (0.840) (0.200) (0.150) (0.160) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect  Yes   Yes  
Firm - Meeting Fixed Effect   Yes   Yes 
Distance to Election Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.020 0.030 0.100 0.010 0.030 0.100 






















Indirect Effect of Entrenchment: Opportunism Resistance 
 This table presents the heterogenous effect of passing a proposal on changes in the adjusted CDS spread on 
the meeting date (t), one day after (t + 1), and so on and the cumulative effect from t + 5 to t + 7. DT is the 
sum of the indicator variables related to dividend and takeover related covenants. Higher values of the index 
are associated with more exposure to shareholder opportunism. The dependent variable is the adjusted CDS 
spreads that are calculated using a rating-adjusted method. The model specification is given in Equation (A6). 
All columns use seven separate polynomials of order six to control for the effect of any determinant of changes 
in adjusted CDS spreads that is continuous in vote share. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are 
reported in parentheses, and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 Opportunism Resistance Hypothesis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
DAY_OF_VOTE, t -0.883 -1.248 -2.720* 
 (0.410) (0.270) (0.070) 
ONE_DAY_LATER, t + 1 -3.794** -4.194** -5.579** 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.030) 
TWO_DAYS_LATER, t + 2 -1.176 -1.445 -2.861* 
 (0.230) (0.200) (0.060) 
THREE_DAYS_LATER, t + 3 -0.328 -0.578 -3.234 
 (0.830) (0.710) (0.100) 
FOUR_DAYS_LATER, t + 4 -1.346 -2.034* -4.029** 
 (0.200) (0.080) (0.040) 
DAYS t + 5 to t + 7 -0.482 -1.694 -4.872 
 (0.890) (0.630) (0.320) 
DT × DAY_OF_VOTE, t -0.394 -0.121 0.214 
 (0.550) (0.860) (0.790) 
DT × ONE_DAY_LATER, t + 1 1.952 2.237* 2.592* 
 (0.110) (0.090) (0.100) 
DT × TWO_DAYS_LATER, t + 2 -0.030 0.163 0.749 
 (0.960) (0.830) (0.420) 
DT × THREE_DAYS_LATER, t + 3 0.316 0.303 1.241 
 (0.670) (0.690) (0.200) 
DT × FOUR_DAYS_LATER, t + 4 0.332 0.761 1.035 
 (0.540) (0.200) (0.280) 
DT × DAYS t + 5 to t + 7 0.004 0.931 1.446 
 (1.000) (0.560) (0.570) 
DT 0.010 0.074 0.000 
 (0.960) (0.820) (0.890) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect  Yes  
Firm-Meeting Fixed Effect   Yes 
Distance to Election Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.022 0.045 0.124 
Observations 10,796 10,796 10,796 





Muting Wealth Redistribution Channel: Firms with High Existing Level of Shareholder-Bondholder Conflict 
This table reports the heterogeneity in the effect of votes on adjusted CDS spreads for the cross-section of firms with high existing level of shareholder-bondholder conflict. Credit Rating columns 
compare the effect for companies with an investment grade bond rating (BBB and above) and noninvestment grade (high yield) issues. CEO Ownership columns compare the effect for companies 
with large (top quartile) and small (bottom quartile) insider ownership, measured by the percentage of company shares owned by the CEO. Leverage columns compare the effect for companies with 
high (top quartile) and low (bottom quartile) leverage. Dividend columns compare the effect for companies with high (top quartile) and low (bottom quartile) dividends. Cash Flow Growth columns 
compare the effect for companies with shirking and expanding cash flows. Panel B shows that ameliorating entrenchment can increase CDS spreads through its indirect negative effect. DT is the 
sum of the indicator variables related to dividend and takeover related covenants. Higher values of the index are associated with more exposure to shareholder opportunism. In all specifications the 
dependent variable is the adjusted CDS spreads that are calculated using a rating-adjusted method. The model specification is given in Equation (A6). All columns use seven separate polynomials 
of order six to control for the effect of any determinant of changes in adjusted CDS spreads that are continuous in vote share. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are reported in parentheses 
and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. 
Panel A Cumulative Adjusted CDS Spread 






















DAY_OF_VOTE, t -0.452 -5.213*   -0.425 -4.276* -1.950 -4.029 1.799 -7.492* -5.720*** -0.142 
 (0.340) (0.090) (0.810) (0.080) (0.570) (0.210) (0.280) (0.080) (0.010) (0.830) 
ONE_DAY_LATER, t + 1 -1.171 -6.140**  0.030 -3.971 1.527 -12.110**  -1.530 -2.421 -5.313** -0.230 
 (0.190) (0.020) (0.980) (0.170) (0.420) (0.030) (0.740) (0.160) (0.020) (0.710) 
TWO_DAYS_LATER, t + 2 -0.024 -8.038**  0.789 -5.019* 0.174 -8.062*   3.683 -3.156*   -2.098 -0.305 
 (0.950) (0.050) (0.230) (0.090) (0.920) (0.060) (0.430) (0.070) (0.350) (0.480) 
THREE_DAYS_LATER, t + 3 -0.558 -2.946 2.224 -11.943* -0.369 -14.583*** 4.671 -8.804**  -7.757* 0.318 
  (0.580) (0.160) (0.120) (0.090) (0.900) (0.000) (0.600) (0.030) (0.060) (0.610) 
DAYS t + 4 to t + 7 -0.484 -2.793 4.144 2.979 8.815 -22.781 7.502 -15.478* -8.015* 2.486 
 (0.578) (0.807) (0.410) (0.580) (0.310) (0.200) (0.197) (0.062) (0.100) (0.120) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to Election Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.030  0.080  0.130 0.140  0.160 0.240 0.1534 0.094 0.120 0.110 































DAY_OF_VOTE, t -0.870 -3.171 -1.799 -3.565 -1.629 -2.647 2.034 -11.596*   -8.184* 0.717  
(0.420) (0.430) (0.540) (0.140) (0.300) (0.240) (0.480) (0.070) (0.070) (0.620) 
ONE_DAY_LATER, t + 1 -3.002* -10.551* 0.767 -8.596*   -1.533 -1.613 -6.571 -3.463*   -10.205*** 1.043  
(0.100) (0.090) (0.630) (0.090) (0.580) (0.520) (0.420) (0.100) (0.010) (0.390) 
TWO_DAYS_LATER, t + 2 -0.108 -10.323 0.671 -7.347**  0.460 0.448 11.567 3.670 -3.318 -0.486  
(0.880) (0.100) (0.680) (0.020) (0.750) (0.790) (0.400) (0.430) (0.470) (0.600) 
THREE_DAYS_LATER, t + 3 -0.946 -0.811 4.663*** -15.543*** 7.043 -1.776 11.352 -0.294 -13.778*** 0.635 
 (0.550) (0.800) (0.000) (0.010) (0.280) (0.560) (0.170) (0.970) (0.010) (0.580) 
FOUR_DAYS_LATER, t + 4 -0.637 -4.400 2.453 -10.471**  -0.533 -16.873*** 0.087 -5.693 -4.499 -0.134 
 (0.380) (0.140) (0.310) (0.010) (0.840) (0.010) (0.990) (0.200) (0.170) (0.900) 
DAYS t + 5 to t + 7 -0.292 -5.853 -2.661 -2.602 -2.665 -3.196 11.536 -8.441 -9.523 5.678 
 (0.870) (0.720) (0.540) (0.670) (0.440) (0.590) (0.280) (0.170) (0.010) (0.060) 
DT × DAY_OF_VOTE, t 0.402 -1.688 2.209 -0.846 1.264 -0.393 -0.031 3.608 1.856 -0.616 
 (0.500) (0.370) (0.360) (0.360) (0.260) (0.720) (0.980) (0.230) (0.400) (0.470) 
DT × ONE_DAY_LATER, t + 1 1.856 2.792 -1.183 3.428 1.449 -1.385 3.335 1.017**  3.639** -0.766 
 (0.130) (0.370) (0.190) (0.140) (0.110) (0.230) (0.220) (0.030) (0.010) (0.310) 
DT × TWO_DAYS_LATER, t + 2 0.093 2.459 -0.095 2.445*   0.413 -0.058 -5.113 -0.892 0.939 0.146 
 (0.830) (0.490) (0.930) (0.050) (0.720) (0.970) (0.430) (0.350) (0.670) (0.820) 
DT × THREE_DAYS_LATER, t + 3 0.350 -2.343 -3.639*** 6.776*** 1.285 3.939 -4.197 -0.263 4.788** -0.136 
 (0.670) (0.180) (0.000) (0.000) (0.670) (0.150) (0.490) (0.710) (0.040) (0.850) 
DT × FOUR_DAYS_LATER, t + 4 0.234 2.045 -1.238 5.843*** 1.300 7.740*** 0.948 -0.730 2.090 0.127 
 (0.490) (0.140) (0.100) (0.000)  (0.250) (0.000)  (0.570) (0.620) (0.140) (0.800) 
DT × DAYS t + 5 to t + 7 0.480 -0.658 -1.725 4.804 1.695 4.204 -3.074 -0.340 2.206 -1.923 
 (0.630) (0.920) (0.540) (0.060) (0.550) (0.180) (0.540) (0.870) (0.240) (0.290) 
DT -0.351* 2.209 0.098 0.172 -0.040 -1.185 0.377 0.012 -0.159 0.361 
 (0.070) (0.200) (0.940) (0.790) (0.960) (0.180) (0.770) (0.990) (0.860) (0.480) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to Election Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.039 0.113 0.257 0.165 0.161 0.110 0.163 0.110 0.123 0.111 









Muting Management Disciplining Channel: Firms with Low Existing Level of Managerial Entrenchment 
This table reports the heterogeneity in the effect of votes on adjusted CDS spreads for the cross-section of firms with low existing level of managerial entrenchment. 
The two columns associated with E-Index compare the effect for companies with high E-Index (above median) and low E-Index (below median). E-Index is 
entrenchment index constructed by Bebchuk et al. (2009). The two columns associated with CEO tenure compare the effect for companies with CEOs with tenure less 
than 4 years and more than 4 years. The two columns associated with CEO Duality compare the effect for companies with CEO duality exists and without CEO duality. 
The two columns associated with Acquisition Activity compare the effect for companies with high (above median) and low (below median) acquisition activities. In 
all specifications, the dependent variable is the adjusted CDS spreads that are calculated using a rating-adjusted method. The model specification is given in Equation 
(A6). All columns use seven separate polynomials of order six to control for the effect of any determinant of changes in adjusted CDS spreads that are continuous in 
vote share. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are reported in parentheses and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, 
respectively. 
 Cumulative Adjusted CDS Spread 
 E-Index CEO Tenure CEO Duality Acquisition Activity 
 
Low        
E-Index 
High       
E-Index 
Tenure < 4 
Yrs 










DAY_OF_VOTE, t -0.454 -1.377 -1.155 -1.037 -2.192 -0.696 -0.464 -1.843**  
 (0.680) (0.230) (0.200) (0.190) (0.500) (0.180) (0.620) (0.020) 
ONE_DAY_LATER, t + 1 -1.281 -1.191 -1.144 -1.353 -1.409 -1.391* -2.257 -1.569**  
 (0.220) (0.450) (0.260) (0.510) (0.690) (0.070) (0.170) (0.020) 
TWO_DAYS_LATER, t + 2 -0.704 0.228 -1.428 -0.077 -2.178 -0.969 -1.533 -0.980*   
 (0.470) (0.910) (0.200) (0.910) (0.530) (0.110) (0.190) (0.070) 
THREE_DAYS_LATER, t + 3 1.916 -1.748 -0.781 -0.698 -1.816 -0.253 0.185 -0.323 
 (0.130) (0.670) (0.530) (0.710) (0.280) (0.830) (0.930) (0.710) 
DAYS t + 4 to t + 7 7.833 -2.305 0.468 -2.663 -7.913 -1.452 -0.216 -0.435 
   (0.100) (0.530) (0.842) (0.468) (0.215) (0.688) (0.970) (0.750) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to Election Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.108 0.072 0.035 0.137 0.1148 0.0503 0.07 0.06 










Long-Term Effect of Governance Proposals on the Risk of Debt 
This table presents the effect of passing governance proposals on long-term outcomes related to debt risk. Model specification is given by Equation (A5), where the 
dependent variable is the changes in outcome (i.e., credit rating) between periods t and t + 1 on the first row, t and t + 2 on the second row, and so on. Each row therefore 
reports the coefficient for a separate estimation. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. To save space we only report R2 and number of observations for the 
first regression for each outcome variable. All columns control for firm and year fixed effects as well as distance-to-election. All columns allow for two separate 
polynomials of order four on each side of the majority threshold. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are reported in parentheses and significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ONE_YR_LATER, t + 1 0.101 0.107*** -0.014** -0.003* 0.042** 0.008** 0.011** -0.004** -0.025*** 
 
(0.300) (0.000) (0.020) (0.070) (0.050) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.000) 
TWO_YRS_LATER, t + 2 0.445*** 0.057 -0.012 -0.004* 0.004 0.008 0.015** -0.004* -0.031** 
 
(0.010) (0.310) (0.260) (0.070) (0.890) (0.200) (0.040) (0.080) (0.040) 
THREE_YRS_LATER, t + 3 0.615** 0.063 -0.009 -0.004 0.022 0.006 0.023** -0.006* -0.020 
 
(0.010) (0.430) (0.530) (0.130) (0.500) (0.500) (0.030) (0.100) (0.310) 
FOUR_YRS_LATER, t + 4 0.672** 0.075 -0.007 -0.005 0.029 0.007 0.020 -0.006 -0.030 
 
(0.030) (0.450) (0.700) (0.180) (0.440) (0.550) (0.140) (0.150) (0.220) 
FIVE_YRS_LATER, t + 5 0.687* 0.017 -0.005 -0.006 0.012 0.006 0.014 -0.005 -0.022 
 
(0.070) (0.880) (0.830) (0.110) (0.790) (0.640) (0.380) (0.330) (0.430) 
R2 0.160 0.070 0.120 0.080 0.040 0.080 0.040 0.130 0.670 
Observations 14,557 13,732 16,964 15,081 17,010 16,561 16,754 15,896 14,876 
 
Appendix. Variable Definition 
 
Variable Definition 
SIZE The logarithm of book value of total assets (AT) 
LEVERAGE The ratio of debt in current liabilities (DLC) and long-term debt (DLTT) to total assets (AT) 
CDS_SPREAD CDS Spread is the spread of CDSs for a firm’s five-year senior unsecured debt with a modified 
restructuring clause in basis point (Markit) 
CUMM_ADJ_CDS_SPRD_CHANGE Cumulative Adjusted CDS Spread Change is the sum of the Adjusted CDS Spread Change on 
voting day and one day after (Markit) in basis points. 
SOTCK_AB-RET-ONMEET_DAY Stock Abnormal Returns are computed using the Fama–French and momentum factors (CRSP). 
Accounting variables are from COMPUSTAT 
CASH/ASSETS The ratio of cash and short-term investments (CHE) to total assets 
ROA The ratio of operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) to the book value of total assets (AT) 
SALES_GROWTH The annual growth in sales (SALE). 
CF/ASSETS The ratio of income before extraordinary items (IBC) to the lagged value of total assets (AT) 
CF_VOLATILITY The standard deviation of the annual growth rate of cash flows, where cash flow growth rate is the 
ratio of change in operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) to the average of sales 
(SALE) in the beginning and end of a fiscal year 
CREDIT_RATING_INDEX A number between 1 and 22 corresponding to S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating 
(SPLTICRM) 
INT_COVRAGE_RATIO The ratio of interest and related expense (XINT) to the sum of income before extraordinary items 
(IB) and interest and related expense (XINT) 
CEO_OWNERSHIP The Executive Comp’s CEO stock ownership (SHROWN_TOT_PCT) 
Z-SCORE 3.3 × pre-tax income (PI) + sales (SALE) + 1.4 × retained earnings (RE) + 1.2 × (current assets 
(ACT) – current liabilities (LCT)) divided by total assets (AT). 
INT_EXP-TO-DEBT The ratio of interest and related expense (XINT) to the sum of the debt in current liabilities (DLC) 
and long-term debt (DLTT). 
STOCK_PRIC_VOL Annual average of the logarithm of the absolute value of the percentage change in daily stock 
price  
All abbreviations in parentheses refer to annual COMPUSTAT items. 
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This online appendix provides detailed discussions and analyses related to (1) diminishing 
marginal effect of bondholder wealth expropriation of stronger shareholder control, (2) 
regression discontinuity design and its validity tests, such as continuity in vote distribution and 
preexisting differences, (3) superiority of credit default swap relative to bond yield spreads, (4) 
a graphical analysis of the cumulative adjusted CDS spreads, (5) constructing the covenant 
index, and (6) a battery of robustness  checks that includes (i) controlling for equity returns, (ii) 
using unadjusted CDS spreads, (iii) vote manipulation, (iv) CDS sample selection bias. This 









I. Internet Appendix 
Tables  
Table A.1 
Shareholder Governance Proposals 
This table summarizes the shareholder proposals for observations with nonmissing company name, voting date, and vote result 
from ISS and CDS from Markit from 2001 to 2011. 
Panel A: Shareholder Proposal Summary Statistics 







Std. Dev. Vote 
Outcome 
2001 105 21 27.3% 20.0% 21.01 
2002 177 61 36.4% 34.5% 22.64 
2003 331 110 35.1% 33.2% 23.48 
2004 289 75 32.0% 26.0% 24.67 
2005 274 75 34.5% 27.4% 23.37 
2006 318 104 40.8% 32.7% 22.80 
2007 327 83 37.0% 25.4% 21.64 
2008 214 50 38.0% 23.4% 22.62 
2009 282 93 43.2% 33.0% 20.39 
2010 242 66 40.5% 27.3% 19.67 
2011 159 37 40.0% 23.3% 20.53 
Total 2,718 775 37.2% 28.5% 22.58 








Auditors 35 2.86% 16.65% 
Board 381 3.41% 25.20% 
Compensation 918 10.35% 27.20% 
G-Index 947 58.18% 53.76% 
Voting 228 40.79% 47.82% 
Other 209 10.53% 20.07% 


















Description of All Shareholder Proposals 





#-2,+2 #-5,+5 #-10,+10 
Audit  35 2.9% 0 1 1 
 Rotate auditors 1 0.0% 0 0 0 
 limit consulting by auditors 31 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Shareholder approval of auditor 3 33.3% 0 1 1 
Board  381 3.4% 13 26 63 
 Commit to/report on board diversity 10 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Increase audit committee Independence 1 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Increase key committee Independence 13 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Lead director 4 0.0% 0 0 1 
 Limit director tenure 25 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Miscellanea 68 2.9% 4 8 12 
 Separate chairman/CEO 222 4.1% 8 14 44 
 Allow union/employee reps on the board 2 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Create nominating committee 1 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Increase compensation committee independence 5 20.0% 1 2 3 
 Independent nominating committee 4 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Majority of independent directors 26 3.8% 0 2 3 
Compensation  918 10.4% 54 132 257 
 Add performance criteria to equity-based awards 27 14.8% 2 5 10 
 Advisory vote on compensation 185 18.4% 30 71 129 
 Approve/disclose/limit SERPs 28 14.3% 3 5 11 
 Award performance-based stock options 88 2.27% 2 5 18 
 Expense stock options 69 60.9% 13 26 43 
 Disclose executive compensation 37 0.0% 1 1 3 
 Hire independent compensation consultant 2 0.0% 0 2 2 
 Link executive pay to social criteria 63 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Misc compensation 38 5.3% 1 3 8 
 Pension fund surplus reporting 15 6.7% 0 1 6 
 Require equity awards to be held 41 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Restrict director compensation 14 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Approve executive compensation 1 50.0% 0 0 1 
 Cap executive pay 308 2.1% 2 12 25 
 No repricing underwater stock options 1 0.0% 0 1 1 
 Pay directors in stock 1 0.0% 0 0 0 
Other  209 10.9% 11 23 39 
 Double board nominees 26 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Miscellanea 133 15.8% 11 23 36 
 Opt out of state takeover statute 1 100.0% 0 0 1 
 Reincorporate to U.S. state 27 3.7% 0 0 2 
 Restore preemptive rights 1 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Change annual meeting date 1 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Change annual meeting location 6 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Study sale of company 14 0.0% 0 0 0 
Voting  228 40.8% 32 72 130 
 Equal access to proxy 4 0.0% 0 1 2 
 Majority vote to elect directors 223 41.7% 32 71 128 
 No discretionary voting 1 0.0% 0 0 0 
Total G-Index  947 58.2% 60 134 288 
G-Delay Shareholders may call special meeting 129 38.8% 16 36 73 
G-Delay Repeal classified board 239 89.1% 9 24 62 
G-Other Remove antitakeover provisions & other 23 13.0% 0 0 1 
G-Other Adopt antigreenmail provision 3 33.3% 0 0 1 
G-Other Redeem or vote on poison pill 155 73.5% 15 28 45 
G-Protection Maximum director liability 2 0.0% 0 0 0 
G-Protection Vote on future golden parachutes 115 50.4% 8 21 47 
G-Voting Adopt cumulative voting 159 3.8% 6 12 32 









#-2,+2 #-5,+5 #-10,+10 
G-Voting Confidential voting 2 100.0% 0 0 0 
G-Voting Eliminate supermajority provision 114 86.0% 6 13 27 




Frequency of Proposals per Firm-Meeting 
This table presents the frequency of numbers of proposals that are put to vote on a 
single meeting day in our sample. Column 1 displays the total number of proposals 
on a meeting day; Column 2 shows the number of proposals that received at least 
50% of shareholder votes; Column 3 shows number of proposals that received less 
than 50% of votes; and Column 4 is the ratio of Column 2 divided by Column 1. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
No. of Proposals 
per Meeting Total Passed 
Not 
Passed % Passed 
1 850 326 524 38.35 
2 700 197 503 28.14 
3 408 112 296 27.45 
4 320 81 239 25.31 
5 200 27 173 13.50 
6 90 13 77 14.44 
7 49 6 43 12.24 
8 56 5 51 8.93 
9 45 8 37 17.78 



















Heterogeneity in the Effect of Votes on Adjusted CDS Spreads with Respect to G-Index 
This table compares the regression of the changes in adjusted CDS spreads on the passage of proposals for 
companies with high versus low G-Index. The dependent variable is the adjusted CDS spreads that are 
calculated using a rating-adjusted. The model specification is given in Equation (A6). The results for companies 
with G-Indexes above the median are presented in Columns (1) and (3), and G-Indexes below the median 
companies are in Columns 2 and 4. All columns use seven separate polynomials of order, six to control for the 
effect of any determinant of changes in adjusted CDS spreads that is continuous in vote share. The cumulative 
changes in CDS spreads on days t, t + 1, and t + 2 in Column 1 is significant at 0.10 and in Column 3 at 0.065. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are reported in parentheses and significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Cumulative Adjusted CDS Spread 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 G-Index ≥ 10 G-Index ≤ 9 G-Index ≥ 10 G-Index ≤ 9 
Day of Vote, t -0.623 1.450* -3.663 1.836* 
 (0.720) (0.060) (0.240) (0.060) 
One Day Later, t + 1 -4.752 0.521 -5.878 0.779 
 (0.290) (0.650) (0.250) (0.640) 
Two days later, t + 2 -0.884 -5.608 -1.975 -5.408 
 (0.460) (0.460) (0.690) (0.490) 
Days t + 3 to t + 7 8.234 -0.261 -8.206 2.787 
 (0.340) (0.970) (0.300) (0.660) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect   Yes Yes 
R2 0.170 0.040 0.300 0.070 




G-Index and Change in Adjusted CDS Spread 
This table displays the result of the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression of changes in annual adjusted 
CDS spread on G-Index for 2002, 2004, and 2006. 
Control variables include accounting variables from 
COMPUSTAT that are used as control: Size, Leverage, 
ROA, Interest Coverage Ratio and an integer index. See 
Table A.5 for the definition of the control variables. 
  CDS Spread 
G-Index -5.177**  
 (0.040) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes 
















I.A Diminishing Marginal Effect of Bondholder Wealth Expropriation of Stronger 
Shareholder Control 
In Section II.B, our framework implicitly assumes that the marginal bondholder wealth 
expropriation effects of stronger shareholder control fall as the level of shareholder-bondholder 
conflict rises. To justify this assumption, we first need a proxy for the level of shareholder-
bondholder conflict and then we ought to show that the value of the risky bond falls at a decreasing 
pace as the proxy for shareholder-bondholder conflict increases.  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), leverage gives rise to shareholder–bondholder 
conflict, where shareholders have an incentive to take on more risk to increase their value. 
Moreover, it is well-known that a raise in asset volatility can aggravate shareholder-bondholder 
conflict (Merton, 1974). Specifically, in the context of Merton-type models, equity is a call option 
on the corporate assets in a levered firm. The value of a risky bond is equal to the value of a 
portfolio of a risk-free but otherwise identical bond plus a short position in a put option written on 
the firm’s assets. In this context, risk shifting raises asset volatility and thereby increases the value 
to shareholders (i.e., the value of the call option increases) but reduces the value to bondholders 
(i.e., the value of the short put increases). That is, risk shifting exacerbates asset substitution 
concerns for bondholders, which in turn aggravates shareholder-bondholder conflict. Therefore, 
asset volatility (volatility henceforth) is a reasonable proxy for the level of shareholder-bondholder 
conflict. 
To justify our assumption, we need a theoretical bond valuation model and then we have to 
show that the first derivative of the bond value with respect to volatility is negative, while the 
second derivative is positive. We use Merton (1974) model as the underpinning theory. As 
mentioned above, in a Merton framework the value of a risky debt is essentially equal to cash (risk-




free debt) minus a put option. Therefore, given that cash is insensitive to volatility, the first 
derivative of the bond value with respect to volatility is equal to the negative of the put option’s 
vega. Vega of any option is always positive. Option values increase in volatility. Therefore, 
negative vega is always negative, indicating that the value of the risky bond falls as shareholder-
bondholder conflict increases.  
The second derivative of the bond value with respect to volatility is essentially equal to the 
second derivative of the put option value with respect to volatility. This “Greek” is called vomma 
(sometimes referred to as volga or volatility-Gamma). Vomma is the rate at which vega changes. 
However, unlike vega, vomma can be either positive or negative. Using Black-Scholes notations, 
vomma is negative when d1 and d2 have different signs.  
Given that vomma could be either positive or negative, we resort to simulation to show that the 
marginal bondholder wealth expropriation effects of stronger shareholder control fall as the 
conflict rises. Specifically, using Merton model (1974), we simulate bond values by changing 
volatility while holding other parameters unchanged. These parameters are held at values that are 
consistent with our sample. Figures below depict the results of our simulations. 
Our sample leverage ratio is 29%, therefore, in all simulation we use $29 and $100 for the face 
value of debt (strike of the put) and the asset value, respectively. Results are insensitive to other 
values for the face value of debt. According to TRACE database, the average maturity of traded 
plain vanilla corporate bonds during our sample period is around 9.2 years; therefore, time to 
maturity parameter is kept at 9.2 years.17 We separately use the average of 3-month, 1-year, 2-year, 
and 10-year constant maturity Treasury rates (from FRED database) during our sample period to 
proxy for the risk free rate parameter. 
 
17 Results are robust to changing the maturity to 5 years to alleviate the concern that our sample is comprised of 5-
year CDS contracts. 




As depicted in Figures A.1 through A.4, our simulation result confirms that for high levels of 
shareholder-bondholder conflict as proxied by volatility, the marginal bondholder wealth 
expropriation effects of stronger shareholder control fall as the level of shareholder-bondholder 
conflict rises; and this simulation result is insensitive to different values of time to maturity, interest 
rates, and face value of debt. 













































































































Figure A.1- Face value of is $29. Asset value is $100. Maturity 
is 9.2 years. Risk-free rate is 1.98%, the mean of the 3-month 
 
Figure A.2- Face value of is $29. Asset value is $100. Maturity 
is 9.2 years. Risk-free rate is 2.2%, the mean of the 1-year rate. 














































































































Figure A.3- Face value of is $29. Asset value is $100. Maturity 
is 9.2 years. Risk-free rate is 2.5%, the mean of the 2-year rate. 
Figure A.4- Face value of is $29. Asset value is $100. Maturity 
is 9.2 years. Risk-free rate is 4.05%, the mean of the 10-year rate. 




I.B Regression Discontinuity Design 
Consider vft as the percentage of votes for passing a governance proposal for firm f on a meeting 
date at time t. If vft ≥ v*, where v* is the majority threshold, the proposal passes. Using Dft as an 
indicator for whether the proposal is passed, we call an observation “treated,” or Dft =1 if vft ≥ v*, 
and otherwise “untreated” or Dft = 0.  
To estimate the effect of treatment Dft on an outcome variable yft, (e.g., the effect of passing a 
governance proposal on the adjusted CDS spread), we can write:  
 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 =  𝑀𝑀 + θ𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 (A1) 
where θ is the effect of passing a proposal on outcome yft ; and uft , the error term, is the omitted 
firm characteristics at time t that also affect the outcome variable, yf. The endogeneity between the 
treatment, Dft, and the error term, uft, (i.e., the voting outcome may be a function of unobservable 
firm characteristics) makes it quite difficult to estimate θ from Equation (A1).   
To overcome the endogeneity problem, regression discontinuity design uses the exogenous 
shift in voting outcome for a narrow window of votes around the majority threshold. As formally 
shown by Lee (2008), as long as there is random noise components to the vote, the assignment of 
observations to the treatment group (pass a proposal and therefore Dft = 1) and the control group 
(failing to pass a proposal, or Dft = 0) can be considered random. The random assignment of 
observations to treatment and control enables us to get a consistent estimate that is not affected by 
the omitted variables.  
Following the example of Lee and Lemieux (2010) to use all the observations to improve the 
efficiency of our estimates, we use a polynomial in votes to capture the effect of any variable that 
is a continuous function of the vote and affects the outcome. Using separate polynomials for 
observations on the right side, Pr (νft , γr ), and Pl (νft  ,γl ) on the left side of the majority threshold, 
we can write:  




 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 =  θ𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟�𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 , γ𝑟𝑟� + 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙�𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 , γ𝑙𝑙� + 𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖. (A2) 
Two distinct features of the data distinguish it from a standard regression discontinuity design: 
(a) the dynamic nature of the treatment, i.e., treatments occur at different points of time, and the 
possibility of a continuation of the impact of treatment occurs over time in periods after the 
treatment, and (b) the intensity of treatment, i.e., on some voting days more than one proposal is 
passed as illustrated in Table 5. To address the dynamic features of treatment we follow the Cellini 
et al. (2010) dynamic version of Equation (A2) given by:  
 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖+τ =  θτ𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖  + 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟�𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 , γτ𝑟𝑟� + 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙�𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 , γτ𝑙𝑙 � + ατ + η𝑐𝑐 + λ𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖τ (A3) 
where yf,t+τ  is the outcome variable in τ periods after the vote date, ατ is a fixed effect for the time 
distance to election date, ηc is the calendar year fixed effect, and λft is the firm-election fixed effect 
for firm f in period t.  
Alternatively, instead of estimating a separate equation for each τ, we can add distributed lags 
in treatment to the model as follows. Note that in this case the coefficient θ is interpreted as the 
causal effect per proposal passed. 
𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 =  ∑ θτ 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖−τ𝑇𝑇τ=0 +  ∑ �𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟�𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖−τ,  γτ𝑟𝑟 � + 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙�𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖−τ,  γτ𝑙𝑙  ��𝑇𝑇τ=0 + ατ +  η𝑐𝑐 +  λ𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖  + 𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 (A4) 
As for the second feature, multiple proposals, we follow the work of Cuñat et al. (2012) and 
capture the intensity of treatment by aggregating the number of proposals, 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾 , passed on a meeting 
day and adding up vote shares, ∑ 𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁𝐾𝐾=1  , for K = 1, …, N as follows: 
 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 =  θ ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾 +𝑁𝑁𝐾𝐾=1  �𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟�∑ 𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾 , γ𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝐾𝐾=1 � + 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙�∑ 𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾 , γ𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝐾𝐾=1 �� + 𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖. (A5) 
Finally, to combine the dynamic features with vote aggregation, we combine Equations (A4) and 
(A5) and write: 
𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 =  ∑ θ𝜏𝜏  ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖−τ𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁𝐾𝐾=1𝑇𝑇τ=0 +  ∑ �𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟�∑ 𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖−τ𝐾𝐾 , 𝛾𝛾τ𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝐾𝐾=1 � + 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙�∑ 𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖−τ𝐾𝐾 ,  γτ𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝐾𝐾=1 ��𝑇𝑇𝜏𝜏=0 +  ατ +  η𝑐𝑐 +
 λ𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖  + 𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖                                    (A6)  




I.C Tests for Quasi-Experiment  
In this section, we evaluate the extent to which our design offers a “quasi-experiment” via 
random assignment of observations to treatment (pass) and control (fail) groups. We test for the 
possibility of vote manipulation around the passing threshold and the imbalance of the resulting 
control and treatment groups.  
I.C.1 Continuity in Vote Distribution  
To verify whether the assignment to control and treatment groups is random around the 
threshold, we perform the standard McCrary (2008) test for continuity of vote distribution around 
the passing threshold. The test statistics of 0.1187 and standard deviation of 0.1385 (or a p-value 
of 0.38) indicates no discontinuity in vote distribution around the passing threshold, suggesting no 
manipulation of votes around the threshold. We repeat this test for proposals put to vote after 2003, 
given that Bach and Metzger (2019) show that there is evidence of vote manipulation around the 
threshold of the corporate charter for the period after 2003. Again, the test statistics of 0.2419 and 
standard error of 0.1838 (or p-value of 0.19) is suggestive of no manipulation. The density plots 
for both tests are provided below (Figure A.5). This is consistent with the findings of other studies 
(i.e., CGG and Flammer, 2015), which also find smooth distribution for shareholder-sponsored 
proposals around the passing threshold. 





Panel A: All Proposals  Panel B: Proposals after 2003 
Figure A.5 McCrary Test Results 
This figure presents a density plot for the McCrary (2008) test to test for the continuity of the distribution of vote shares for shareholder proposals. Data in Panel 
A include all proposals in our sample between 2001 and 2011, whereas the sample is restricted in Panel B to those proposals after 2003. The horizontal axis 
represents the share of votes, and vertical axis is the logarithm of the estimated density.




I.C.2 Preexisting Differences   
If the assignment to treatment and control groups is random, we expect the resulting 
groups to be similar. In Table A.6, we examine whether there are preexisting differences 
in firm characteristics between the two groups. Also, since one would expect the 
heterogeneity to reside in managerial and shareholder ownership distribution 
characteristics, we include variables related to both characteristics, namely CEO ownership, 
CEO tenure, CEO duality, E-index, and percentage of institutional ownership (collected 
from Factset). We test for differences in means before the election for the entire sample in 
Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 as well as for observations close to the threshold in Columns 3 and 
6.  
In Columns 1 to 3, we test for similarity of characteristics of the treatment and control 
groups in the year (or day in the case of CDS spreads) before the election. Results in 
Column 1 show that except for size and credit rating, no other characteristics differ 
significantly between the two groups. When we add a polynomial in percentage of votes in 
Column 2, we find no significant differences between the two groups, including for size 
and credit rating. We find similar results for the subsample of observations close to the 
threshold in Column 3. Similarly, in Columns 4 to 6 we find no significant differences in 
changes in firm characteristics from (t  ̶  2) to (t  ̶  1). For managerial and shareholder 
ownership, we observe the same pattern. For close call proposals, there is some significant 
difference around discontinuity associated with CEO ownership and duality, but the 
difference vanishes when we employ the polynomials. 
In sum, we find no evidence of vote manipulation or any preexisting differences in the 
treatment and control groups that contradict the random assignment assumption. Therefore, 




we conclude that there is no systematic difference between the treatment and control groups 
before the election, thus confirming the validity of our identification strategy.  
In the end, we acknowledge that RDD is subject to the standard criticism that it only 
identifies the local average treatment effect. Bach and Metzger (2019) raise new concerns 
about using RDD to identify causal effects of governance provisions. However, RDD is a 
widely used methodology in corporate finance research to circumvent the endogeneity 
issues and to establish causality. As such, we reported earlier that we find no evidence of 
manipulation of votes around the threshold. 





Pre-Existing Differences as a Function of Vote Outcome 
In this table we examine whether there are preexisting differences in firm characteristics between the treatment (pass) and control 
(fail) groups. We test for differences in means in the year before the election for the entire sample in Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 as well 
as for observations close to the threshold in Columns 3 and 6. The only exception is the CDS change in the first two rows, where t 
refers to days instead of years. Columns 1 to 3 consider the levels of firm characteristics, whereas Columns 4 to 6 consider the 
change in characteristics. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix in the paper. Each entry is estimated using a separate 
regression. p-values are reported in parentheses, and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by*, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 Before Meeting (t - 1) Change from (t – 2) to (t – 1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CDS Spread Changes (Unadjusted) 0.142 0.2 -0.376 
   
 
(0.61) (0.78) (0.17) 
   
CDS Spread Changes (Adjusted) -1.241 3.451 1.052 
   
 
(0.29) (0.34) (0.57) 
   
Size -1.084*** -0.194 -0.45 0.011 -0.009 -0.026  
(0.00) (0.63) (0.11) (0.34) (0.84) (0.46) 
Leverage Ratio -0.024 -0.012 -0.02 -0.003 0.006 0.011  
(0.17) (0.74) (0.42) (0.29) (0.64) (0.32) 
Cash/Assets 0.01 0 0.03 -0.00001 -0.002 -0.001  
(0.21) (0.99) (0.20) (0.97) (0.86) (0.87) 
ROA 0.008 0.034 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.003  
(0.33) (0.39) (0.91) (0.85) (0.96) (0.61) 
Sales Growth 0.01 0.054 0.02 -0.003 0.122 0.026  
(0.28) (0.24) (0.55) (0.85) (0.20) (0.64) 
Cash Flow/Assets 0.001 0.01 0.003 0.001 -0.008 0.001  
(0.81) (0.71) (0.82) (0.67) (0.53) (0.90) 
Cash Flow Growth Volatility -0.001 0.00 0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.00  
(0.52) (0.96) (0.21) (0.37) (0.65) (0.99) 
Credit Rating (1 to 22) -1.341*** -0.135 -0.518 0.073 0.078 0.148  
0.00  (0.89) (0.46) (0.12) (0.71) (0.30) 
Interest Coverage Ratio 0.129 -0.046 0.382 -0.038 0.011 0.003  
(0.28) (0.88) (0.37) (0.86) (0.98) (1.00) 
CEO Ownership 0.002 0.004 0.006* -0.001 -0.002 -0.002  
(0.32) (0.39) (0.08) (0.36) (0.30) (0.30) 
CEO Tenure 0.119 0.851 0.647 0.275 -0.944 -0.739  
(0.74) (0.48) (0.43) (0.19) (0.24) (0.20) 
CEO Duality -0.056** 0.126 0.125** -0.013 -0.067 -0.011  
(0.02) (0.17) (0.01) (0.36) (0.45) (0.88) 
E-Index 0.717*** 0.431 0.326 -0.057 -0.003 0.11  
(0.00) (0.27) (0.23) (0.38) (0.99) (0.59) 
%Institutional Ownership 6.568*** 3.801 4.177 0.926**  -0.695 -1.344  
(0.00) (0.34) (0.15) (0.02) (0.68) (0.37) 
Sample All Votes All Votes Close 
Calls 
All Votes All Votes Close 
Calls 
Polynomial in vote share No Yes No No Yes No 
 
 




I.D Superiority of Credit Default Swap (CDS) relative to bond yield spread 
Firms have a variety of bonds outstanding with different maturities, seniority, and liquidity. 
How to aggregate these different bonds to measure the total effect of a corporate event is 
not obvious (Bessembinder et al., 2008). In contrast, while there are CDS contracts with 
different maturities referencing the same entity, five-year single-name CDSs are the most 
common and most liquid format (Hull et al., 2004); thus, only one CDS per firm needs to 
be valued. By using CDS spread data, we also avoid the introduction of any additional 
noise arising from choosing a particular risk-free specification. The choice of a risk-free 
benchmark introduces noise into yield spread specifications (Houweling and Vorst, 2005), 
and the choice of a method to mitigate the coupon effect could exacerbate the problem. On 
the contrary, the notional amount of CDS contracts grew from $0.6 trillion in June 2001 to 
a peak of $62.2 trillion by the second half of 200718 and has rapidly become the most 
prominent and liquid credit derivative. In general, the CDS market is known to be far more 
liquid and efficient than the corporate bond market, with CDS spreads reflecting changes 
in the credit quality of a reference entity in a more timely manner than the spreads of the 
corresponding bond issues (Blanco et al., 2005; Ericsson et al., 2009). Studies by Daniels 
and Jensen (2005) and Zhu (2006) show that price discovery occurs first in the CDS market 
and subsequently in the bond market. Furthermore, since new CDS contracts can be written 
at any time, the CDS market is less susceptible to liquidity risk (Longstaff et al., 2005). 
The Ericsson et al. (2009) results further confirm that CDS spreads are less noisy in 
reflecting riskiness of debt than yield spreads. Contrary to Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and 
Martin (2001), they find limited evidence for the existence of a common factor.  
 
18 See ISDA Market Survey Summaries, 2010-1995 (http://www2.isda.org/functional-
areas/research/surveys/market-surveys/). 




I.E Graphical Analysis of the Cumulative Adjusted CDS Spread  
Figure A.6 shows the difference in the average cumulative adjusted CDS spreads for 
corporate governance proposals that pass or fail within 2% of the election threshold in a 
time window around the election date. The time window varies from two days prior to 
seven days after the election date. This is the same measure as that in the fourth column of 
Table 3, except that in Table 3 the adjusted CDS spread is computed over a (0, +1) time 
window, whereas here it is calculated from (-2, 0) to (0, +7) where t = 0 is the election date. 
(For example, for t = 1 or the equivalent (0, +1) time window, the value is -4.060, which is 
identical to the value in Column 4 of Table 3.) Also presented are 90% confidence intervals 
as indicated by dashed lines.  
 
Figure A.6 
Cumulative CDS Adjusted Return Around the Election Date 
The solid line in this figure represents the dynamics of the average effect of passing a corporate 
governance proposal on the adjusted change in CDS spread over different time windows around 
the meeting date, t = 0. The dashed lines represent the 90% confidence interval for this effect. 
The effect is measured using a regression of the adjusted change in CDS spreads on whether the 
proposal passed for observations within two points of the majority threshold for a rolling window 
of time. This window starts from two days before meeting to the meeting date, [-2, 0], and next 
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We can see from the graph that prior to the election date the cumulative adjusted CDS 
spreads for the proposals that pass are insignificantly different from those that do not pass. 
After the election date, the cumulative adjusted CDS spread for passing proposals is 4.06 
bps lower than the rejected proposals in one day (time window (0, +1)), which is 
statistically significant at 3%. This difference widens to an average of -6.78 bps over the 
following days, t = +2 to t = +7. We can also observe that the largest drop in difference in 
cumulative spreads occurs on the first day following the election with no reversal pattern 
on the following days. Thus, to the extent that CDS spreads are a reliable proxy for 
bondholder risk, our results indicate a reduction in the riskiness of debt, and bondholders 
view improvement in corporate governance (defined as stronger shareholder rights) to have 
a net positive effect.  
I.F Constructing the Covenant Index 
Helwege, Huang, and Wang (2016) classify covenants into 30 types and then, following 
Chava et al. (2010), they aggregate them into four categories, namely restrictions on 
dividend (S1), subsequent financing (S2), investment (S3), and firm behavior during 
specific events (S4). For the purpose of this study, we focus on covenants related to 
dividend payout (S1) and takeover (type29).19 We follow Helwege et al. (2016) for the 
calculation of S1 and type29. At the issuance of any debt instrument, we define two 
separate indicator variables for dividend and takeover covenants and set their value to 1 if 
at least one of the related covenants for each of these categories is included in that issue. 
 
19 Restriction on dividend payout (S1) is comprised of the following covenants: Dividend-related payments 
and dividend restrictions. After reviewing all the 30 covenant types and 4 categories, we concluded that 
covenant type 29, merger restrictions, is more closely related to takeover-related restriction. Type 29 is 
comprised of the following covenants: consolidation_merger, after_acquired_property_clause, 
voting_power_ percentage,ESOP_ voting_power_percentage, where ESOP is employee stock ownership 
plan. According to Helwege et al. (2016), type 29 “typically specify that the surviving entity must assume 
the debt and abide by all of the covenants in the debt.” See Table 2 in Helwege et al. (2016) for more detail. 




As discussed in the footnote, dividend and takeover covenant categories are comprised of 
multiple covenants restricting the same activity. This strategy avoids inflating the effect of 
a covenant category. Next, we aggregate our issue-level covenant data to firm-month level. 
Specifically, we construct two new indicator variables corresponding to the same issue-
level indicators. For each firm in each month, we set the value of the newly constructed 
indicator equal to 1 if its corresponding issue-level indicator is 1 for at least one of the 
issues outstanding for that firm in that month. DT for a firm in a given month is then the 
sum of the two new indicators for that firm in that month. According to the results in Chava 
et al. (2010), higher values of the index are associated with more exposure to shareholder 
opportunism. Finally, we use a similar aggregation algorithm to move from monthly-level 
index to annual level for each firm by finding the maximum of the index for each firm 
across the 12 months in each year. 
I.G Robustness Checks  
I.G.1 Controlling for Equity Return  
A potential concern with our main result is that the drop in CDS spreads may not be a 
direct result of governance improvement, but rather a mechanical effect of positive equity 
return as documented by CGG. To address this concern, in Table A.7 we re-estimate an 
augmented version of our models (Equations (A1) and (A2)) where equity return is added 
as a control variable. In Panel A, equity returns are calculated using the market model, 
whereas in Panel B the Fama-French Model is used to calculate equity returns.20 Although 
in some cases the magnitude is smaller, overall we find that our results are robust with 
respect to the inclusion of equity returns. This suggests that the impact of governance 
 
20 Given the finding by CGG that it takes only one day for the stock market to react to shareholder proposals, 
we narrow our time window to one day here instead of two days in Table 3. 




improvement on the CDS spread is not solely the result of the increase in equity value but 




I.G.2 Unadjusted CDS Spreads 
Another potential concern is the way the abnormal CDS spreads are calculated by using 
a rating-adjustment method. As illustrated in Equation (1), rating-adjusted CDS spreads 
are calculated by subtracting the average CDS spreads for issues with the same rating. 
Gormley and Matsa (2014) show that demeaning the dependent variable with respect to the 
group can produce inconsistent estimates; they recommend using a fixed effect model 
instead. To do this, we re-estimate the baseline specification in Tables 3 and 4 by using 
Adjusted CDS Spread Response to Governance Proposals Conditional on Equity Return 
This table presents regression results of the cumulative adjusted change in CDS spreads from the day of the meeting t = 0 to the next 
day t = 1 in response to passage of a governance proposal. Adjusted CDS spreads are calculated using a rating-adjusted method. The 
model specifications for Columns 1-5 are given in Equation (A1) and for Column 6 in Equation (A2) with the only difference that 
here equity abnormal return is added as a control variable to Equations (A1) and (A2). Equity returns are calculated using Market 
Model in Panel A and Fama-French Model in Panel B. Column 1 estimates are based on the whole sample. Column 2 restricts the 
sample to observations with a vote share within 10 points of threshold; Columns 3 to 5 restrict the sample to 5, 2, and 1 points of 
the threshold, respectively. Column 6 uses the full sample (winsorized at 1% and 99%) by introducing a polynomial in the vote share 
of order 6, one on each side of the threshold. All columns control for year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-
values are reported in parentheses, and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Panel A: Market Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All Votes −10; +10  −5; +5 −2; +2 −1; +1 Full Model 
Pass 0.505 -1.279 -4.263*** -2.682**  -2.934* -6.486**  
 (0.600) (0.120) (0.010) (0.020) (0.100) (0.020) 
Equity Abnormal Return -0.409 0.201 -0.083 -0.824* -1.012**  -0.386 
 (Market Model) (0.330) (0.780) (0.920) (0.090) (0.050) (0.370) 
R2 0.010 0.010 0.034 0.065 0.082 0.017 
Observations 2,718 776 387 170 105 2,724 
       
Panel B: Fama-French 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All Votes −10; +10  −5; +5 −2; +2 −1; +1 Full Model 
Pass 0.515 -1.260 -4.287*** -2.713** -2.945 -6.426**  
 (0.590) (0.130) (0.010) (0.020) (0.110) (0.020) 
Equity Abnormal Return -0.464 0.116 0.039 -0.864 -1.042 -0.444 
 (Fama French Model) (0.290) (0.880) (0.970) (0.160) (0.120) (0.320) 
R2 0.010 0.010 0.034 0.065 0.082 0.017 
Observations 2,718 776 387 170 105 2,724 




changes in unadjusted CDS spreads as a dependent variable and add fixed effects for credit 






Dynamics of Impact of Aggregate Votes on Unadjusted CDS Spreads 
This table presents the effect of passing a proposal on changes in the unadjusted CDS spread on the meeting 
date (t), one day after (t + 1), and the cumulative effect from t + 2 to t + 7. The dependent variable is the 
unadjusted CDS spread. The model specification is given in Equation (A6). All columns use seven separate 
polynomials of order six to control for the effect of any determinant of change on adjusted CDS spreads that 
are continuous in the vote share. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are reported in parentheses, 
and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Changes in Unadjusted CDS Spread 
Using All Proposals 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Day of Vote, t -1.353** -1.308** -1.942* 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.060) 
One Day Later, t + 1 -1.336 -1.302 -1.853 
 (0.130) (0.150) (0.200) 
Days t + 2 to t + 7 -2.305 -2.205 -6.434 
 (0.410) (0.480) (0.310) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect  Yes  
Firm-Meeting Fixed Effect   Yes 
Distance to Election Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Rating Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.016 0.034 0.102 
Observations 11,376 11,376 11,376 
 
 
Unadjusted CDS Spread Response to Governance Proposals 
This table presents regression results of the cumulative unadjusted change in CDS spreads from the 
day of the meeting t = 0 to the next day t = 1 in response to passage of a governance proposal. The 
model specification for Columns 1-5 is given in Equation (A1) and for Column 6 in Equation (A2). 
All columns control for year and rating fixed effects. Column 1 estimates are based on the whole 
sample. Column 2 restricts the sample to observations with a vote share within 10 points of the 
threshold; Columns 3 to 5 restrict the sample to 5, 2, and 1 points of the threshold, respectively. 
Column 6 uses the full sample (winsorized at 1% and 99%) by introducing a polynomial in the vote 
share of order 6, one on each side of the threshold. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values 
are reported in parentheses, and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, 
and ***, respectively. 
 Cumulative Changes in Unadjusted CDS Spread 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Votes −10; +10 −5; +5 −2; +2 −1; +1 Full Model 
Pass 0.210 -1.473 -2.926** -3.061** -3.461 -4.811** 
 (0.880) (0.340) (0.040) (0.020) (0.150) (0.020) 
       
R2 0.033 0.022 0.047 0.137 0.198 0.037 
Observations 2,718 776 387 170 105 2,718 
 




Table A.8 shows that our main results are robust with respect to how we adjust for 
rating. When using fixed effects instead of demeaning the CDS spreads for rating 
categories, the size of the Pass coefficient drops by up to 1.7 bps, but by and large the 
results are still statistically significant with the caveat that p-values are marginally larger 
than those in Table 2. Table A.9 also provides similar evidence in support of robustness of 
the results for the dynamics of the impact. Similar to Table 3, CDS spreads drop 
proportionately on day t, t + 1, and the days between t + 2 and t + 7. However, unlike the 
results in Table 3, the drop in CDS spreads is statistically significant only on day t. 
I.G.3 Vote Manipulation 
Another legitimate concern with our analysis is that RDD is invalid if agents can alter 
or manipulate the outcome. In the context of our study, the concern is that managers may 
have incentives to acquire power, formal and informal, to intervene in close votes and 
manipulate the outcome towards the passage (failure) of manager-friendly (shareholder 
power-enhancing) proposals (see Bach and Metzger (2019)). Therefore, it is imperative to 
empirically establish the validity of the random-assignment assumption.  
Given that shareholder-sponsored proposals are not binding, intuition suggests that 
managers will only intervene in proposals that are more likely to be implemented. Thus, 
we disaggregate shareholder proposals in terms of likelihood of implementation and then 
examine the impact on CDS spreads through the RDD. In doing so, we borrow from the 
results in Ertimur et al. (2010). They document that the likelihood of implantation is higher 
for defense and voting proposals (labeled as shareholder right) as well as for the proposals 
that are sponsored by the unions. To show that our results are not driven by these proposals, 
we drop them from our sample and employ the RDD on a new sample that contains 




proposals that are less likely to be manipulated. Results are reported in Table A.10. In the 
first column, we drop 1,175 defense and shareholder right proposals from the 2,718 total 
proposals that were originally analyzed and reported in Table 2. Results for the remaining 
proposals shows a 9 basis points drop in adjusted CDS that is statistically significant at 5%. 
In the second column, we drop 899 proposals sponsored by the unions. CDS spreads for 
the remaining proposal drop by 6 basis points (significant at 1%). In the third column, we 
drop defense and voting proposals as well as proposals sponsored by the unions. The result 
shows a statistically significant drop in the CDS spreads of about 11 basis points. These 
results are consistent with our earlier finding in Table 2 and add to its credibility. 
Table A.10 
Vote Manipulation 
Cumulative Changes in Adjusted CDS Spread 






Defense and Voting & 
Sponsored by Unions 
Pass -9.0710**  -6.1920*** -11.1250**  
 (0.0400) (0.0100) (0.0500) 
R2 0.0264 0.0235 0.0338 
Observations 1,543 2,117 1,110 
This table presents regression results of the cumulative adjusted change in CDS spreads 
from the day of the meeting t = 0 to the next day t = 1 in response to passage of a 
governance proposal. Adjusted CDS spreads are calculated using a rating-adjusted 
method. The model specification is given in Equation (A1). Column 1 estimates are based 
on the whole sample (winsorized at 1% and 99%) after dropping defense and voting 
proposals. In Column 2 proposals sponsored by unions are dropped (winsorized at 1% 
and 99%). Column 3 further restricts the sample by dropping all defense and voting 
proposals as well as those sponsored by unions. All columns control for year fixed effects 
and the information contained in distance to majority threshold using a polynomial in the 
vote share of order 6, one on each side of the threshold. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm. p-values are reported in parentheses, and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
I.G.4 CDS Sample Selection Bias 
Another major concern with our analysis is the sample bias that may arise from 
considering only firms with traded CDS contracts. Subrahmanyam et al. (2014a) show that 
the inception of CDS trading is not random. Ex-ante, CDS trading may be more likely to 




be initiated for certain types of firms. Ex-post, the existence of CDS trading may distort 
real incentives of managers and/or impact the severity of the shareholder-bondholder 
conflict. The presence of CDS trading as an insurance contract ameliorates bondholder 
agency risk from shareholder opportunism, and therefore lowers the sensitivity of CDS 
spreads to changes in shareholder control, implying that our estimates likely understate the 
effect in the overall population. Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014a; 2014b) show 
that CDS firms tend to be larger, safer, more profitable, with more working capital, and 
hold more cash. In this case also, our estimates likely understate the effect in the overall 
population. Nevertheless, we address this concern in two ways. First, we compare the 
distribution of our sample financial- and governance-related characteristics with those of 
public firms during the sample period. Second, and more formally, we address the selection 
bias by employing a Heckman (1979) type self-selection model (similar to Subramanyam 
et al. (2014a)) in conjunction with RDD design. 
Table A.11 reports the comparison of our sample characteristics and those of the 
COMPUSTAT universe during the sample period. Consistent with Subramanyam et al. 
(2014a), we also find that the firms with traded CDS contracts in our sample are larger and 
have stronger balance sheets with relatively high credit quality. But the evidence is mixed 
with respect to their managerial entrenchment levels. Their managers have shorter tenures 
but are more likely to also be the chairman of the board. Furthermore, these firms have 
greater number of major antitakeover defenses in place, as measured by E-Index. Overall, 
it does not appear that the benefit of stronger shareholder control to bondholders are 
overstated in our results but may be understated. 
Table A.11 
Comparing the Distribution of the Sample Characteristics with Those of COMPUSTAT 
Universe 




 Our Sample  All COMPUSTAT   
  Mean Median Obs.  Mean Median Obs.  Diff 
Ln(Assets) 10.056 9.966 1,750  5.24 5.418 127,581  4.816*** 
Cash/Assets 0.101 0.065 1,750  0.195 0.086 127,558  -0.094*** 
EBIT/Assets 0.085 0.077 1,749  -1.472 0.029 125,860  1.557*** 
Sales/Assets 0.824 0.661 1,750  1.061 0.583 126,796  -0.237** 
PPENT/Assets 0.308 0.256 1,686  0.256 0.146 124,599  0.052*** 
Leverage Ratio 0.234 0.171 1,745  0.209 0.11 113,630  0.025*** 
Rated 0.986 1.000 1,750  0.214 0.000 128,165  0.772*** 
RE/Assets 0.209 0.192 1,747  -29.083 -0.004 124,061  29.292*** 
CAPX/Assets 0.043 0.035 1,720  0.064 0.028 120,922  -0.021*** 
Tenure 5.464 4.000 1,709  7.527 5.000 37,725  -2.063*** 
Duality 0.838 1.000 1,479  0.674 1.000 19,709  0.164*** 
E-Index 3.250 3.000 1,141  3.089 3.000 28,304  0.161*** 
 
To formally address the effects of selection bias caused by CDS trading, we use Heckman’s 
selection model. Heckman’s selection model improves our estimation results for the effect 
of being selected for CDS trading. Subrahmanyam et al. (2014a) find that CDS contracts 
are more likely to be traded for firms with high credit quality and visibility (size). Therefore, 
our revised empirical model consists of two equations: the main RDD equation, which is 
the same as equation (A2),  
 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 =  θ𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟�𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖, γ𝑟𝑟� + 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙�𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 , γ𝑙𝑙� + 𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖. (A2) 
and a selection equation that describes the characteristics of the firms for which CDS 
spread, 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,  is observable, i.e., firms that have active CDS trading: 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖. (A7) 
with        𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 ,𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖� = ρ 
where 𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖  is the firm characteristics for credit quality (i.e., Cash/Assets, EBIT/Assets, 
Sales/Assets, PPENT/Assets, Leverage, RE/Assets standing for retained earnings to total 
assets ratio, CAPX/Assets, and Rated standing for having a bond rating or not) and 
visibility (Ln(Assets)) that Subrahmanyam et al. (2014a) found to be significant 
determinants of having a CDS contract or not. If ρ ≠ 0 the standard OLS estimations for 
the single RDD equation will be biased. Using Heckman’s maximum likelihood estimation 




procedure to combine the RDD and the selection equation provides consistent and efficient 
estimates. Finally, we test for ρ = 0  to assess the extent to which our original RDD 
estimates (single equation) are biased because of the endogeneity between the error terms 
for the two equations.  
Table A.12 shows the estimation results. The estimation results for the RDD model and 
the selection model are reported in the upper and lower panels, respectively. Columns 1 
and 3 report the original OLS model in which selection is ignored, whereas Columns 2 and 
4 use Heckman’s model and take the selection issue into consideration. Comparing 
Columns 1 to 2 or 3 to 4 shows that estimation results for the RDD model and for the 
combination of the RDD and Heckman selection model are very similar and consistent 
with our earlier main findings. This is reassuring that our original RDD estimates are not 
biased. Moreover, the results of the endogeneity test show that the correlation coefficient, 
ρ, does not reject the null hypothesis that ρ = 0 with p-values of .315 and .137 for models 
in Columns 2 and 4, respectively. Overall, this exercise confirms that sample selection does 
not seem to generate any bias in our estimates.   
 





Robustness Check: Sample Selection bias   
Cumulative Changes in Adjusted CDS Spread 
RDD Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pass -6.087*** -5.970*** -5.559** -5.413**  
(0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) 
Selection Equation 


























































   
0.054***     
(0.000) 
CAPX/Assets 
   







Uncensored obs. 2,611 2,611 2,557 2,557 
Total obs. 2,611 109,384 2,557 103,245 
Endogeneity test  











This table presents regression results of the cumulative adjusted change in 
CDS spreads from the day of the meeting t = 0 to the next day t = 1 in 
response to passage of a governance proposal. Adjusted CDS spreads are 
calculated using a rating-adjusted method. The model specification for 
Columns 1 and 3 are given in Equation (A1) and for Column 2 and 4 in 
Equation (A7) in which sample selection is taken into account using 
Heckman procedure. The upper panel presents the estimation results for 
the main equation, whereas the lower panel present the estimation result 
for the selection model. All columns use the full sample (winsorized at 1% 
and 99%). All columns control for year fixed effects and the information 
contained in distance to threshold by using a polynomial in the vote share 
of order 6, one on each side of the threshold. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm. p-values are reported in parentheses, and significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
 





Bach, L., and D. Metzger, How Close Are Close Shareholder Votes?, The Review of 
Financial Studies, Volume 32, Issue 8, August 2019, Pages 3183–3214, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy126 
Bessembinder, H., K.M. Kahle, W.F. Maxwell, and D. Xu. 2008. Measuring Abnormal 
Bond Performance. Review of Financial Studies 22(10): 4219–58. 
Blanco, R., S. Brennan, and I.W. Marsh. 2005. An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic 
Relation Between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps. The Journal of 
Finance 60(5): 2255–81. 
Cellini, S.R., F. Ferreira, and J. Rothstein. 2010. The Value of School Facility Investments: 
Evidence from a Dynamic Regression Discontinuity Design. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 125(1): 215–61. 
Chava, S., Kumar, P., and Warga, A. (2010). Managerial Agency and Bond Covenants. 
The Review of Financial Studies, 23(3), 1120-1148. 
Collin-Dufresne, P., R. Goldstein, and J.S. Martin. 2001. The Determinants of Credit 
Spread Changes. Journal of Finance 56, 2177-207. 
Cuñat, V., M. Gine, and M. Guadalupe. 2012. The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate 
Governance on Shareholder Value. The Journal of Finance 67(5): 1943–77. 
Daniels, K.N., and M.S. Jensen. 2005. The Effect of Credit Ratings on Credit Default Swap 
Spreads and Credit Spreads. Journal of Fixed Income 14: 16-33. 
Ericsson, J., K. Jacobs, and R. Oviedo. 2009. The Determinants of Credit Default Swap 
Premia. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44(1): 109–32 
Flammer, C. 2015. Does Corporate Social Responsibility Lead to Superior Financial 
Performance? A Regression Discontinuity Approach. Management Science 61(11): 2549–
68.  
Heckman, J.J., 1979. Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica 47(1): 
153-161. 
Helwege, J., J.Z. Huang, and Y. Wang, 2016. Debt Covenants and Cross-Sectional Equity 
Returns. Management Science 64(1): 1835 - 1854. 
Houweling, P,. and T. Vorst. 2005. Pricing Default Swaps: Empirical Evidence. Journal of 
International Money and Finance 24(8): 1200–25 
Hull, J., M. Predescu, and A. White. 2004. The Relationship between Credit Default Swap 
Spreads, Bond Yields, and Credit Rating Announcements. Journal of Banking and Finance 
28(11): 2789-811. 
Jensen, M.C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4): 305–60. 




Lee, D. 2008. Randomized Experiments from Nonrandom Selection in U.S. House 
Elections. Journal of Econometrics 142: 675–97. 
Lee, D., and T. Lemieux 2010. Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics. Journal 
of Economic Literature 48: 281–355. 
Longstaff, F.A., S. Mithal, and E. Neis. 2005. Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or 
Liquidity? New Evidence from the Credit. The Journal of Finance 60(5): 2213–53. 
McCrary, J. 2008. Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity 
Design: A Density Test. Journal of Econometrics 142: 698–714. 
Merton, R. 1974. On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates. 
Journal of Finance 29: 449-70. 
Subrahmanyam, M.G., D.Y. Tang, and S.Q. Wang. 2014a. Does the Tail Wag the Dog? 
The Effect of Credit Default Swaps on Credit Risk. Review of Financial Studies 27: 2926-
60. 
Zhu, H. 2006. An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and 
the Credit Default Swap Market. Journal of Financial Services Research 29(3): 211–35. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2542878
